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BEYOND REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION:
THE AVAILABILITY AND STRUCTURE OF A
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WORKPLACE
HARASSMENT UNDER THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT*
Frank S. Ravitch*
INTRODUCTION
Employment discrimination law has undergone a metamorphosis
in the last few years. New legislation and judicial interpretation of
existing legislation have broadened the rights available to the victims
of discrimination, and have created new duties with which employers
must comply. The passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act'
added one of the largest pieces to the new employment discrimination
puzzle. Because the ADA is still in the early stages of development, it
is essential to define the bases for potential causes of action under the
Act, and to delineate workable structures for analyzing those causes
of action.
The ADA was signed into law in 1990.2 Title I of the ADA
prohibits discriminatory employment practices against qualified indi-
viduals with disabilities,' and requires employers to reasonably ac-
commodate such individuals unless accommodation would constitute
an undue hardship on the employer.4
* © Frank Ravitch, 1993.
** B.A., Tulane University, 1987; J.D., The Dickinson School of Law, 1991; L.L.M. Candi-
date Georgetown University, 1994. Senior Intern for Equal Employment Opportunity law to
Representative Leslie Byrne, United States House of Representatives. Prior to attending Ge-
orgetown and working for Representative Byrne, Mr. Ravitch practiced in the employment/
labor department of Capehart & Scatchard in New Jersey. The views set forth in this Article
are solely those of the Author, and do not necessarily represent the views of any of the Au-
thor's past or present employers.
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. III 1991) [hereinafter ADA].
2 The United States Senate passed S. 933, the Senate adaptation of the ADA, on Septem-
ber 7, 1989. 135 CONG. REC. S10,803 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989). The United States House of
Representatives passed H.R. 2273, its version of the Act, on May 22, 1990. 136 CONG. REC.
H2638 (daily ed. May 22, 1990). The final draft of the ADA was signed in both the Senate and
House on July 17, 1990, and President Bush signed it into law on July 26, 1990. 1 ADA Man.
(BNA) No. 23, at 70:0083 (Jan. 1992) (legislative history summary which provides a chrono-
logical listing of all legislative action on the ADA).
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (Supp. III 1991).
4 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. III 1991). Title I of the Act became effective on July
26, 1992, for employers that have twenty-five or more employees, and will become effective on
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Since the passage of the ADA, much of the material discussing
its employment provisions has focused on the duty to provide reason-
able accommodation. However, the ADA's proscription of discrimi-
natory employment practices against disabled individuals goes beyond
this requirement. The Act precludes discrimination in any term or
condition of employment. 5 In this regard the ADA is similar to Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,6 which prohibits employment
discrimination and workplace harassment based on race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin, and the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act,7 which prohibits discrimination and harassment based on
age.
This Article addresses the basis for a cause of action under the
ADA arising from workplace harassment, and sets forth a structure
for ADA harassment claims. The structure suggested is a modified
form of the "hostile work environment" cause of action.' Signifi-
cantly, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission9 has issued
Proposed Guidelines defining when harassment against several pro-
July 26, 1994, for employers that have fifteen or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A)
(Supp. III 1991) provides:
The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting com-
merce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such
person, except that, for two years following the effective date of this subchapter, an
employer means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 25
or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in
the current or preceding year, and any agent of such person.
Id.; see also 1 ADA Man. (BNA) No. 23, at 70:0001 (Jan. 1992) (explanatory note prior to
Act).
5 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (Supp. III 1991).
6 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988) [hereinafter Title VII].
7 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988) [hereinafter ADEA].
8 The theory of hostile work environment is based on the concept that workplace harass-
ment can become actionable when it creates a hostile or abusive working environment. It was
first recognized in Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957
(1972), which acknowledged the availability of a cause of action arising from a working envi-
ronment heavily charged with discrimination. Although Rogers was based on a hostile racial
environment, the cause of action for hostile work environment has been developed primarily in
the context of sexual harassment, and in 1986 the Supreme Court decided the landmark sexual
harassment case, Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), holding that a hostile work
environment can arise from harassment which is sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the
conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment. Since Meritor, other
courts have developed the cause of action. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.
1991) (discussing the history of the hostile work environment cause of action and refining the
test for such claims in the sexual harassment context). Most recently, the Supreme Court
decided Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993), which reaffirmed Meritor and
attempted to clarify several issues that had developed in the lower courts. See infra text ac-
companying notes 24, 36-37, for a discussion of Harris.
9 Hereinafter the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission will be referred to as
"EEOC."
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tected classes, including disabled individuals, violates federal discrimi-
nation laws;10 those Guidelines also utilize the concept of hostile work
environment. 1 Thus, the existence of a cause of action for hostile
work environment under the ADA has been acknowledged.
Hopefully, the EEOC Proposed Guidelines will heighten aware-
ness regarding the ADA's proscription of workplace harassment
aimed at disabled individuals. However, it is not mandatory that
courts follow EEOC guidelines, 12 and in fact, the EEOC has some-
times reconsidered its own positions concerning guidelines it has
issued. 3 Moreover, the Proposed Guidelines apply to race, color,
religion, gender, age, and national origin, in addition to disability.' 4
Thus, while the Proposed Guidelines as presently drafted are a useful
tool, they do not adequately address some of the unique concerns re-
garding harassment of disabled employees.
It is therefore important to take an in-depth look at the basis for
a harassment cause of action under the ADA, and to develop a work-
able structure for that cause of action. ' Employers need a framework
for workplace harassment of disabled individuals so that they can im-
plement training policies for their agents and employees similar to
those now used regarding sexual harassment.' 6 Similarly, it is impor-
10 EEOC Proposed Guidelines on Harassment Based on Race, Color, Religion, Gender,
National Origin, Age, or Disability, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,266 (1993) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1609) (proposed Oct. 1, 1993) [hereinafter EEOC Proposed Guidelines].
I I d. at 51,269 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609.1(b), (c)).
12 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65; see also Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment Women's Experi-
ence vs. Legal Definitions, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 59-61 (1990) (opining that the Meritor
Court did not follow the EEOC guidelines in determining what harassing conduct is actiona-
ble, but accepted a stricter standard). But see Ellison, 924 F.2d at 877 (stating that the Meritor
Court approved of, and paid detailed attention to, the EEOC guidelines).
13 See, e.g., Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70-71.
14 EEOC Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at 51,268 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1609.1(a)).
15 The EEOC Proposed Guidelines provide an excellent general structure for hostile work
environment claims. However, there are several aspects of the Proposed Guidelines, discussed
more thoroughly below, which this Author believes require modification in relation to the
ADA. The structure for an ADA hostile work environment cause of action set forth in this
Article utilizes the framework of the EEOC Proposed Guidelines where possible, modifying
that structure based on the language of the ADA, and where appropriate, Title VII law.
16 One commentator has acknowledged the increase in employee training regarding sexual
harassment: "One indication of the seriousness with which corporations are beginning to view
the problem of sexual harassment is the growing popularity of videotaped training programs,
designed to alleviate the problem by sensitizing employees to the victim's perspective." Elaine
D. Ingulli, Sexual Harassment in Education, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 281, 285 n.18 (1987) (citation
omitted).
In fact, training regarding the prevention of harassment aimed at several protected classes
may become required for employers to avoid liability for conduct which creates a work envi-
ronment hostile to members of those classes. For example, the EEOC Proposed Guidelines,
supra note 10, at 51,269 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609.2(d)), state that an employer
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tant to recognize and analyze the ADA's breadth now so that both
employees and employers will know their rights and duties.
Part I of this Article outlines the hostile work environment cause
of action as it exists under Title VII, and the reasons that such a cause
of action, with appropriate modifications, is inherent in the language
of the ADA. It also looks at how the relationships among the ADA,
Title VII, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,17 support a cause of
action for harassment under the ADA. Finally, Part I examines state
discrimination laws which protect disabled individuals under the
same statutory scheme as other protected classes. These statutes
demonstrate that utilizing traditional employment discrimination
causes of action in regard to disabled employees is workable.
Part II of this Article sets forth the appropriate structure to be
applied to the hostile work environment cause of action in relation to
disabled employees. The test suggested is similar to the hostile work
environment cause of action under Title VII,' s and to the one set
forth in the EEOC Proposed Guidelines.19 However, modifications to
those tests based on the unique provisions of the ADA are proposed.
These include (1) the requirement that the complainant be a qualified
individual with a disability as defined in the ADA, 2° and (2) the modi-
fication of the Title VII "reasonable person" standard 21 and the
"should take all steps necessary to prevent harassment from occurring, including ... methods
to sensitize all supervisory and non-supervisory employees to issues of harassment .. " Id.
17 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797b (1988 & Supps. I - IV 1989-1992) [hereinafter Rehabilitation
Act].
18 See discussion infra part II.A.2.
19 EEOC Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at 51,268 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt.
1609).
20 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. III 1991) defines a qualified individual with a disability as
follows:
The term "qualified individual with a disability" means an individual with a
disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essen-
tial functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.
For the purposes of this subchapter, consideration shall be given to the employer's
judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has pre-
pared a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the
job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the
job.
Id.
21 In Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993), the Supreme Court applied
the "reasonable person" standard to sexual harassment claims based on hostile work environ-
ment under Title VII. Prior to Harris, it was unclear whether a reasonable person, reasonable
woman, or reasonable person of the same sex standard should apply. However, Harris does
not define reasonable person, and implies that when the victim is female, it may mean "reason-
able woman." See infra notes 24 and 37 for a discussion of possible interpretations of the
reasonable person standard in Harris.
The reasonable woman standard is grounded in the concept that whether harassment
creates a hostile work environment, must be determined based on the victim's perspective,
1478
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EEOC proposed "reasonable person in the same or similar circum-
stances" standard,22 to a "reasonable person with the same disability"
standard. 23  This "same disability" standard acknowledges the fact
while shielding employers from being forced to accommodate the idiosyncratic concerns of
hypersensitive employees. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-81 (9th Cir. 1991) (adopt-
ing reasonable woman standard for these reasons, but acknowledging that when the victim is
male a "reasonable man" standard would apply); see also Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d
1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990) (reasonable person of the same sex as victim standard); Rabidue v.
Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 626 (6th Cir. 1986) (reasonable woman standard), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
22 EEOC Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at 51,269 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1609.1(c)).
23 This standard is similar to the reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances
standard suggested by the EEOC Proposed Guidelines. However, "reasonable person with the
same disability" is a more workable standard, because the standard proposed by the EEOC
could be interpreted in several different ways. For example, "the same circumstances" could
refer to any disability, a broad class of disabilities, or the complainant's exact disability. Like-
wise, because the standard is not specific as to the definition of a reasonable person with whom
the complainant should be compared, it could be interpreted to enable the trier of fact to
determine how a "reasonable person" with a disability would react to a given situation based
on his or her own belief as to what reactions are reasonable for individuals with disabilities.
However, most people do not share a commonality of experience with disabled individuals,
and thus, the average person is incapable of determining what constitutes a reasonable reaction
for a disabled individual.
The "reasonable person with the same disability" standard proposed in this Article pro-
vides for a consistent interpretation of the definition of "reasonable person," and acknowledges
the need for some form of appropriate evidence as to how such people would reasonably react
to a given situation. There are ample resources for determining how individuals with particu-
lar disabilities will likely react to a given situation, and numerous organizations exist to help
individuals with a particular disability. The following list provides examples of such organiza-
tions, but by no means is the list an exhaustive one: the Epilepsy Foundation, Kidney Founda-
tion, American Diabetes Association, Deafpride, Inc., AIDS Foundation, American Council
of the Blind, Lupus Foundation, Cystic Fibrosis Foundation, Association For Retarded Citi-
zens, and the National Parkinson Foundation. See also Information Sources by Disability, 2
ADA Man. (BNA) No. 7, at 90:0001-0095 (Aug. 1992). Additionally, there is psychological
data regarding the sensitivities of individuals with specific disabilities. See Maureen O'Connor,
Defining "Handicap"for Purposes of Employment Discrimination, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 633, 635
n. 12 (1988) (listing several sources regarding the psychological and sociological impact of disa-
bilities); see also Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and
Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413,
424 n.56 (1991) (noting that sexual problems of persons with disabilities are increasingly ad-
dressed and listing several sources dealing with the psychological aspects of disability). Like-
wise, testimony of those with the same disability as the victim could aid the trier of fact in
determining what reactions are reasonable for someone with that same disability.
The EEOC proposed standard may have been meant to refer to individuals with the same
disability as a victim of harassment. If such is the case, specific language saying exactly that
will create less confusion and provide better guidance. The standard proposed in this Article
should provide a workable basis for a trier of fact to evaluate a claim, while avoiding inconsis-
tency such as that caused by the various interpretations of the reasonableness standard in the
sexual harassment context, recently addressed by the Supreme Court in Harris, but not clearly
resolved. See infra note 37 (discussing concerns about, reasonableness standard set forth in
Harris); see also Robert S. Adler & Ellen R. Peirce, The Legal, Ethical, and Social Implications
of the "Reasonable Woman "Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 773
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that individuals with particular disabilities will be offended by differ-
ent conduct.24
Additionally, Part II explores the relationship between reason-
(1993) (in-depth discussion of the evolution of the reasonable woman standard, and the bene-
fits and concerns related to that standard, including concerns relating to its vagueness); Jolynn
Childers, Note, Is There a Place for a Reasonable Woman in the Law? A Discussion of Recent
Developments in Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment, 1993 DUKE L.J. 854 (discuss-
ing reasonable woman standard in sexual harassment cases, and noting that there are defini-
tional problems with that standard); Robert Unikel, Comment, "Reasonable" Doubts: A
Critique of the Reasonable Woman Standard in American Jurisprudence, 87 Nw. U. L. REV.
326 (1992) (stating reasonable woman standard is inappropriate for application in American
jurisprudence, and discussing the practical, theoretical, and linguistic difficulties attendant to
the reasonable woman standard). Thus, it is hoped that when the EEOC issues final guide-
lines, the standard proposed herein is considered. For further discussion of the reasonableness
standard, see infra part II.B.2.
24 Unlike other classes covered by anti-discrimination statutes, which are defined by a sin-
gle trait, such as sex or race, individuals with disabilities are discriminated against based on the
numerous and varied characteristics inherent in the hundreds of disabilities covered by the
ADA. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the unique nature of disabil-
ity discrimination claims in addressing a disparate impact claim brought by a disabled individ-
ual under the Rehabilitation Act:
In our opinion, in the disparate impact context, there should be only minor
differences in the application of the Griggs principles to handicap discrimination
claims. One difference, however, is that, when assessing the disparate impact of a
facially-neutral criterion, courts must be careful not to group all handicapped per-
sons into one class, or even into broad subclasses. This is because "the fact that an
employer employs fifteen epileptics is not necessarily probative of whether he or
she has discriminated against a blind person."
Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 307 & n.20 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Amy Jo
Gittler, Fair Employment and the Handicapped: A Legal Perspective, 27 DEPAUL L. REV. 953,
972 (1978)).
In the hostile work environment context, the numerous disabilities covered under the
ADA, and the varied sensitivities of individuals with such disabilities, demonstrate why the
reasonable person standard set forth in Harris for classes protected under Title VII is inade-
quate in regard to disabled employees. Fortunately, Harris applies only to Title VII, making
no mention of the ADA, and specifically refusing to address the EEOC Proposed Guidelines
which apply to disability. Title VII case law is instructive in the ADA context, but the struc-
ture of causes of action under the ADA must account for the unique concerns relating to
discrimination aimed at disabled individuals. While the Harris standard may indeed mean
reasonable woman when a female is the victim, or reasonable person with the same disability in
the disability context, see infra note 39, it is possible that it will be applied utilizing the trier of
fact's determination of what is reasonable for such an individual based on the totality of the
circumstances. This is dangerous in the disability context because most people have little con-
tact with disabled individuals, and those who do, often have contact only with individuals with
one or two specific disabilities. For example, while a male trier of fact (either judge or jury
member) will likely have significant contact with women to draw on in determining what a
reasonable person in a female sexual harassment victim's situation would consider hostile and
abusive, the same could not be said of most nondisabled individuals hearing a disabled individ-
ual's claim. Thus, for the reasons set forth here and supra note 23, it is essential that the trier
of fact be specifically instructed to consider what a reasonable person with the same disability
as the complainant would deem hostile or abusive in evaluating a hostile work environment
claim in the disability context. How this can be achieved is discussed supra note 23 and part
II.B.2.
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able accommodation and "hostile work environment." While the fail-
ure to reasonably accommodate by itself will seldom reach the level
necessary to create a hostile work environment, instances where fail-
ure to accommodate can contribute to, or even create, a hostile work
environment are delineated.
Finally, Part III discusses employer liability for conduct by co-
employees and supervisors that creates a hostile work environment.
General agency principles set forth under Title VII law, 25 and rein-
forced in the ADA context by the EEOC Proposed Guidelines,26
should be utilized with appropriate modifications. For example, it
is suggested that the Title VII test for employer liability should be
modified to impose strict liability if employers use methods of admin-
istration that have a discriminatory effect, or perpetuate the discrimi-
nation of others subject to the employer's common administrative
control as set forth in section 12113(b)(3) of the ADA. 7 Addition-
ally, when failure to reasonably accommodate contributes to a hostile
work environment, the defenses available in response to the alleged
failure to accommodate claim should apply.28 However, those de-
25 In Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69-73 (1986), the Court stated that while it
was not specifically ruling on employer liability, such liability should be guided by agency
principles. Additionally, the EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11 (1993) [hereinafter EEOC Guidelines on Sex Discrimination], upon which the Mer-
itor Court partially relied, provide:
(c) Applying general title VII principles, an employer, employment agency,
joint apprenticeship committee or labor organization (hereinafter collectively
referred to as "employer") is responsible for its acts and those of its agents and
supervisory employees with respect to sexual harassment regardless of whether the
specific acts complained of were authorized or even forbidden by the employer and
regardless of whether the employer knew or should have known of their occur-
rence. The Commission will examine the circumstances of the particular employ-
ment relationship and the job [flunctions performed by the individual in
determining whether an individual acts in either a supervisory or agency capacity.
(d) With respect to conduct between fellow employees, an employer is re-
sponsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the employer (or its
agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct,
unless it can show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action.
Id. § 1604.11(c), (d).
26 The EEOC Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at 51,269 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1609.2), adopt a test for employer liability which is similar to the traditional Title VII test.
See discussion infra part II.C.
27 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3) (Supp. III 1991).
28 See Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 (1993) [hereinafter EEOC ADA Regulations] (If a re-
quired or necessary accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the
employer's business, such undue hardship is a defense to a claim of failure to accommodate.);
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(3) (Supp. III 1991) (Good faith efforts to identify and provide appropri-
ate reasonable accommodation, in consultation with the qualified individual with a disability,
is a defense to a damage award under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as applied through the
ADA.).
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fenses should not preclude the remaining allegations in a given case, if
they are sufficient, from rising to the level of a hostile work
environment.29
I. WORKPLACE HARASSMENT OF DISABLED INDIVIDUALS IS
ACTIONABLE UNDER THE ADA
A. The Hostile Work Environment Cause of Action
A cause of action for workplace harassment has existed for some
time under federal law,30 and has been recognized under state law.3
The term "hostile work environment" is used to describe a work envi-
ronment that is subject to severe and pervasive harassment which in-
terferes with the terms and conditions of employment and creates a
hostile or abusive working environment-and thus is actionable. 32
Although recently the hostile work environment cause of action has
been used primarily in sex discrimination cases, its genesis was in the
context of race discrimination.33
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson ,3 a sexual harassment case,
the Supreme Court adopted a framework for analyzing the hostile
work environment cause of action. A number of courts, both federal
and state, have interpreted the standards set forth in Meritor, and cre-
ated tests based on those interpretations. 35 Recently, the Court reaf-
29 Such allegations might involve verbal or physical conduct aimed at the complainant, or
any other conduct which rises to the level necessary to create a hostile work environment. See
supra part II (delineating structure for hostile work environment cause of action).
30 The cause of action was originally recognized in 1971 by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
See supra note 8.
31 Courts in several states have recognized a cause of action for hostile work environment;
however, the tests applied to the cause of action vary. Some recent examples of state court
recognition of the actionability of hostile work environment claims include: Fisher v. San Pe-
dro Peninsula Hosp., 262 Cal. Rptr. 842 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Lynch v. City of Des Moines,
454 N.W.2d 827 (Iowa 1990); Bustamento v. Tucker, 607 So. 2d 532 (La. 1992); Radtke v.
Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155 (Mich. 1993); Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445 (N.J.
1993); Scandinavian Health Spa, Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 581 N.E.2d 1169 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1990); Glasgow v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 693 P.2d 708 (Wash. 1985); State ex rel.
Tinsman v. Hott, 424 S.E.2d 584 (W. Va. 1992).
32 Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986); EEOC Proposed Guidelines, supra
note 10, at 51,268 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609.1).
33 See, e.g., Rogers, 454 F.2d at 234.
34 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
35 See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991) (A hostile work environment exists
where an employee is subject to unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature which a reasonable
woman would consider sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the conditions of employment
and create a hostile or abusive working environment.); Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d
1469 (3d Cir. 1990) (A hostile work environment claim can be successful when the employee
can show that he or she suffered intentional discrimination because of sex, the discrimination
was pervasive and regular, the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff, the discrimi-
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firmed the Meritor standard in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. ,36 and
attempted to clarify several aspects of that standard upon which
courts had disagreed. 3 Regardless of the test applied, however, the
parameters of the cause of action are generally the same. At the
center of any hostile work environment test is the requirement that
the work environment be so charged with animus towards a protected
class that it interferes with the terms and conditions of employment.38
The hostile work environment cause of action has been applied in
the sex, race, religion, and-national origin contexts. 39 Thus, the cause
of action is not limited to one protected class; it could apply to any
nation would have detrimentally affected a reasonable person of the same sex in that position,
and as to employers, the existence of respondeat superior liability.); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co.,
842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988) (To prevail on a sexual harassment claim an employee must
show she belonged to a protected group, was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment which
was based on sex and affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment, and regarding
employer liability, her employer knew or should have known of the harassment in question
and failed to take proper remedial actions.); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th
Cir. 1986) (To prevail on a sexually offensive work environment claim an employee must prove
she was a member of a protected class, was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment in the
form of sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature and which had the effect of unreasonably interfering with her work performance
and created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment that affected seriously her
physical well-being and, as to employer liability, the existence of respondeat superior liability.).
In Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993), the Supreme Court addressed some
issues which had arisen under the various tests. See infra note 37. For a discussion of hostile
work environment claims brought under state discrimination laws, and a list of state cases
recognizing same, see supra note 31 and cases cited therein. See also infra part II.A for a
discussion regarding the structure that most courts agree should be applied to hostile work
environment causes of action.
36 i 14 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
37 In Harris, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether harassment, to be
actionable, must seriously affect a complainant's psychological well-being or lead the com-
plainant to suffer injury. Id. at 370. The Court found that there was no such requirement
under Title VII, but noted that the complainant must subjectively perceive the environment as
abusive to make out a claim. Id. at 370-71. Utilizing the general framework set forth in
Meritor, the Court also attempted to clarify the reasonableness standard to be applied to sexual
harassment claims, despite the fact that certiorari was not granted on that issue. Id. The
Court utilized a reasonable person standard, but refused to address the EEOC Proposed
Guidelines which apply a reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances, meaning
reasonable person of the same sex, standard to gender harassment claims, see infra note 151,
and noted that its test is not mathematically precise. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371. Additionally,
whether a working environment is hostile can only be determined by looking at all of the
circumstances. Id. The implication of the Court's failure to address the Proposed Guidelines,
acknowledgment of the imprecise nature of its test, and consideration of the totality of the
circumstances, is that the reasonable person standard proposed in Harris is a flexible one-
which could mean reasonable woman if the victim is female, reasonable African-American if
the victim is black, and so forth.
38 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66-67; Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971). The
structure for a hostile work environment cause of action in the disability context, including
what type of conduct creates a hostile work environment, is set forth in Part II of this Article.
39 See, e.g., Meritor, 477 U.S. at 57 (sex); Rogers, 454 F.2d at 234 (race); Gray v. Grey-
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class protected by a statute that prohibits discrimination in the terms
and conditions of employment. The language and construction of the
ADA, as well as the EEOC Proposed Guidelines, demonstrate the
appropriateness of such a cause of action in the context of disability
discrimination.
B. The Language of the ADA and Interpretive Materials.- The ADA
Protects Disabled Employees Against Workplace
Harassment That Creates a Hostile Work
Environment
1. The Antidiscrimination Provisions of Title I of the ADA
The first section of the ADA delineates the findings of Congress
in relation to disabled individuals.' It acknowledges that, unlike
members of other protected classes, disabled individuals often had no
hound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (race); Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F.
Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (religion and national origin).
40 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Supp. III 1991) provides:
(a) Findings
The Congress finds that-
(1) some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabili-
ties, and this number is increasing as the population as a whole is growing older;
(2) historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with
disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem;
(3) discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical
areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, education, transportation,
communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access
to public services;
(4) unlike individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of
race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or age, individuals who have experienced
discrimination on the basis of disability have often had no legal recourse to redress
such discrimination;
(5) individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of dis-
crimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the discriminatory effects of
architectural, transportation, and communication barriers, overprotective rules
and policies, failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices, ex-
clusionary qualification standards and criteria, segregation, and relegation to lesser
services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities;
(6) census data, national polls, and other studies have documented that peo-
ple with disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and are
severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally;
(7) individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have
been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful
unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our
society, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals
and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual
ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society;
(8) the Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to as-
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legal recourse when they were the victims of discrimination 41 and rec-
ognizes that disabled individuals are a discrete and insular minority
that have suffered restrictions and a history of purposeful discrimina-
tion in many "critical areas," including employment. 2 Thus, equality
for individuals with disabilities is declared to be among the nation's
proper goals. 3
Accordingly, the primary purpose of the ADA is to "provide a
clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of dis-
crimination against individuals with disabilities."' Such language in
the ADA's statement of purpose demonstrates the breadth of the
Act's prohibition on discrimination. Thus, despite the fact that most
materials interpreting the ADA's employment provisions focus on the
duty to accommodate or the denial of employment opportunities
based on disability, the Act prohibits all forms of discrimination
against disabled individuals.
Further proof that the ADA's prohibition of employment dis-
crimination against individuals with disabilities extends beyond rea-
sonable accommodation is derived from the fact that the Act protects
only "qualified" individuals with disabilities, 45 and an individual is
qualified if he or she can perform the essential functions of the job
sure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic
self-sufficiency for such individuals; and
(9) the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and
prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal
basis and to pursue those opportunities for which our free society is justifiably
famous, and costs the United States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses
resulting from dependency and nonproductivity.
(b) Purpose
It is the purpose of this chapter-
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimina-
tion of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing dis-
crimination against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing
the standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with disabilities;
and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to
enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address
the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.
Id.
41 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4) (Supp. III 1991).
42 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3), (7) (Supp. III 1991).
43 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (Supp. III 1991).
44 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (Supp. III 1991).
45 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. III 1991) sets forth what is actionable under the ADA, and
specifically prohibits covered entities from engaging in such discrimination against a qualified
individual with a disability.
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with or without reasonable accommodation." Thus, individuals with
disabilities who need no accommodation are protected under the
ADA.
2. The ADA's, Prohibition of Discrimination in any Term,
Condition, or Privilege of Employment
The ADA specifically prohibits any covered entity from discrimi-
nating against a qualified individual with a disability, because of his
or her disability, in regard to hiring, job applications, advancement,
discharge, compensation, training, or "other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment. '47 As noted earlier, the hostile work envi-
ronment theory is predicated on the infringement of terms and condi-
tions of employment.48
Absent an exception, the ADA should be construed to protect
against workplace harassment of disabled employees. However, the
ADA has no exception precluding claims based on workplace harass-
ment. Indeed, the ADA's prohibition on discrimination in the work-
place is to be broadly construed, 49 and materials interpreting the
ADA, such as the EEOC Proposed Guidelines, acknowledge that the
Act prohibits discrimination in any employment practice. 50
3. The ADA's Prohibition of Methods of Administration That Have
a Discriminatory Effect or Perpetuate the Discrimination of
Others
It would make little sense to prohibit discrimination against dis-
abled individuals in all employment practices, but to provide no re-
dress for workplace harassment-perhaps the most grievous form of
discrimination. In fact, the ADA specifically states that utilizing
methods of administration, standards, or criteria that have a discrimi-
natory effect or perpetuate the discrimination of others, subject to the
common administrative control of the employer, violates the Act.51
46 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. III 1991).
47 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. III 1991).
48 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
49 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Supp. III 1991) sets forth the findings and purpose of the ADA. The
broad remedial purpose of the Act indicates that its provisions, including Title I, should be
construed broadly. See supra note 40 for the full text of § 12101.
50 Nondiscrimination in Other Employment Practices, 2 ADA Man. (BNA) No. 7, at
90:0561, § VII.7.2 (Feb. 1992).
51 EEOC ADA Regulations, supra note 28, § 1630.7; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3)
(Supp. III 1991). In addition to the implications of this provision in relation to hostile work
environment claims discussed in this Part, the provision infers the availability of a cause of
action for disparate impact under the ADA-i.e., a facially neutral policy that has a dispropor-
tionate impact on a protected class.
1486 [Vol. 15:1475
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Administrative methods are often directly tied into claims of hostile
work environment,5 2 and have been used as a basis to create respon-
deat superior liability for harassment perpetrated by supervisors 3 and
coemployees 4
Therefore, an employer who utilizes such methods of administra-
tion is in violation of the ADA. This construction is consistent with
the breadth of the ADA's antidiscrimination provisions, 5 and sup-
ports the availability of a hostile work environment cause of action
under the ADA.
4. The Availability of Compensatory and Punitive Damages Under
the ADA
The ADA provides disabled individuals with the same compre-
hensive remedies that are available to victims of workplace harass-
ment under Title VII. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides that
compensatory damages are available to complainants under the ADA
or Title VII, and in cases involving malice or reckless indifference,
punitive damages are also available.5 6 This is in addition to tradi-
tional employment remedies such as injunctive relief, back pay, front
pay, and restoration of benefits which are likewise available under
both statutes.. 7 Moreover, thepowers and procedures utilized in Title
52 That methods of administration can contribute to a hostile work environment is inherent
in the purpose of the cause of action. For example, delegation of supervisory powers to indi-
viduals insensitive to harassment against a protected class or classes can contribute to the
creation, or perpetuation, of a hostile work environment. See Andrews v. City of Phila., 895
F.2d 1469, 1486 (3d Cir. 1990) (Employer can be liable for harassing conduct where supervi-
sory personnel acquiesce or approve of harassment, and to avoid liability the employer must
show it investigated employee complaints regarding harassment and took appropriate remedial
action.). Moreover, an employer's methods of delegating authority and its policies and proce-
dures can also create a hostile work environment.
53 Methods of administration such as the availability and enforcement of discrimination
policies, grievance procedures, and discipline are directly related to employer liability for hos-
tile work environment claims. See EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1516 (9th Cir.
1989) (holding that employer could be liable for sexual harassment where internal grievance
procedures and discrimination policy were inadequate); see also EEOC Proposed Guidelines,
supra note 10, at 51,269 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609.2(d)) (An employer should take all
steps necessary to prevent harassment, including policies, sanctions, and methods of sensitizing
employees to discrimination.). Any method of administration that has a discriminatory effect
or perpetuates the discrimination of others under the employer's common control could con-
tribute to a hostile work environment if it creates, facilitates, perpetuates, or augments harass-
ing conduct.
54 See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881-83 (9th Cir. 1991) (discussing employer liability
for the conduct of coworkers based on the adequacy of the employer's remedial actions and
related administrative decisions).
55 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
56 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a), (b) (Supp. I 1991).
57 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(2) (Supp. III 1991).
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VII cases are available under the ADA. 8 The specific incorporation
into the ADA of the remedies, powers, and procedures available
under Title VII reinforces the application of the ADA to the types of
discrimination prohibited by Title VII, including hostile work
environment.
5. The ADA Compliance Checklist, the EEOC Proposed Guidelines,
and Workplace Harassment
The ADA Compliance Checklist developed by the Bureau of Na-
tional Affairs59 suggests that employers take steps to prevent work-
place behavior that disabled employees will likely consider
derogatory, negative, stereotypical, demeaning, or otherwise objec-
tionable, and to delete material that disabled employees would find
objectionable from documents utilized by the employer.6" This rec-
ommendation apparently relates to harassment. Likewise, the EEOC
Proposed Guidelines are specifically designed to outline the kind of
behavior that will be actionable as harassment under the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act.61 References to harassment in these materials
supports the application of the hostile work environment cause of ac-
tion under the ADA. Thus, the language of the ADA and the materi-
als that interpret it demonstrate that the Act prohibits workplace
harassment of disabled employees.
C. The Relationships Among The ADA, Title VII, and the
Rehabilitation Act: Implications Regarding Workplace
Harassment and the ADA
1. The ADA and Title VII
Through the ADA, Title VII, and other discrimination statutes,
Congress has provided protection for various classes of individuals
affected by employment discrimination.62
Each statute applies only to the classes it specifically delineates,
thus acknowledging the differences in the provisions necessary to pro-
58 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (Supp. III 1991).
59 Compliance Checklist for Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 1 ADA Man.
(BNA) No. 3, at 20:0051 no. 4 (Apr. 1992).
60 Id.
61 EEOC Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at 51,269 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1609.1(b), (c)).
62 Title VII protects individuals discriminated against based on race, color, religion, sex,
and national origin, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988), while the ADEA protects against age discrim-
ination, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1988), and the ADA protects against discrimination based on disabil-
ity, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (Supp. III 1991).
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tect the various classes.63 Disabled individuals are not protected by
Title VII,64 and racial minorities are not protected as a class by the
ADEA or the ADA.65 Yet, the relationship between Title VII and
the ADEA is instructive in analyzing the relationship between Title
VII and the ADA, because the analysis under one discrimination stat-
ute is often applied to another.
As case law developed under Title VII and the ADEA, the tests
applied to discrimination claims under Title VII were applied to
ADEA claims.66 Although each statute protects different classes,
they utilize similar standards when the discrimination involved is of
the same type. 67 Accordingly, to the extent that a claim under the
ADA is based on the same type of discrimination prohibited under
Title VII, Title VII analysis should apply in resolving the ADA claim.
In this regard, the ADA utilizes the powers, remedies, and pro-
cedures available under Title VII.68 The remedial aspects of the Civil
Rights Act of 199169 also apply to both Title VII and the ADA, and
the findings and purpose of the ADA show an intent to provide a
comprehensive remedial scheme similar to that provided under Title
VII.7° Both procedurally and analytically, the ADA is tied to Title
VII.
2. The Rehabilitation Act, Title VII, and the ADA
Prior to the passage of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act7 was
the only major federal law which protected disabled individuals
against employment discrimination.72 However, the Rehabilitation
63 For example, the unique nature of discrimination against disabled individuals has caused
the ADA to require reasonable accommodation by employers when necessary, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(5)(A), (B) (Supp. III 1991), but there is no such requirement under Title VII. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (1988). However, when the discrimination involves harassment the anal-
ysis under the ADA should reflect Title VII principles. See discussion infra part II.A.
64 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
65 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988) (ADEA); 42 U.S.C. §§'12111-12117 (Supp. III
1991) (ADA).
66 See, e.g., Houser v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 627 F.2d 756, 756-57 (5th Cir. 1980) (adopt-
ing, with modifications, Title VII criteria for a prima facie case of employment discrimination).
67 Id.
68 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (Supp. III 1991).
69 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. III 1991).
70 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Supp. III 1991). This section demonstrates that the purpose of the
ADA is to eradicate discrimination against disabled individuals, and provide such individuals
with a comprehensive remedial scheme to protect their rights. Likewise, Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988), is meant to eradicate discrimination against the classes it pro-
tects, and in connection with the Civil Rights Act of 1991, specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a
(Supp. III 1991), provide a comprehensive remedial scheme.
71 Rehabilitation Act, supra note 17.
72 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4) (Supp. III 1991).
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Act only provides protection if the claimant is employed by the fed-
eral government, is a government contractor, or receives federal fund-
ing.73 The ADA is the first federal statute to prohibit employment
73 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), which applies to employers receiving federal
funding, provides:
(a) Promulgation of rules and regulations
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, as
defined in section 706(8) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his disability,
be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance
or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the
United States Postal Service. The head of each such agency shall promulgate such
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the amendments to this section made
by the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities
Act of 1978. Copies of any proposed regulation shall be submitted to appropriate
authorizing committees of the Congress, and such regulation may take effect no
earlier than the thirtieth day after the date on which such regulation is so submit-
ted to such committees.
(b) "Program or activity" defined
For the purposes of this section, the term "'program or activity" means all the
operations of-
(1)(A) a department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumental-
ity of a State or of a local government; or
(B) the entity of such State or local government that distributes such assist-
ance and each such department or agency (and each other State or local govern-
ment entity) to which the assistance is extended, in the case of assistance to a State
or local government;
(2)(A) a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public
system of higher education; or
(B) a local educational agency (as defined in section 2891(12) of Title 20)
system of vocational education, or other school system;
(3)(A) an entire corporation, partnership, or other private organization, or an
entire sole proprietorship-
(i) if assistance is extended to such corporation, partnership, private organ-
ization, or sole proprietorship as a whole; or
(ii) which is principally engaged in the business of providing education,
health care, housing, social services, or parks and recreation; or
(B) the entire plant or other comparable, geographically separate facility to
which Federal financial assistance is extended, in the case of any other corporation,
partnership, private organization, or sole proprietorship; or
(4) any other entity which is established by two or more of the entities described
in paragraph (1), (2), or (3);
any part of which is extended Federal financial assistance.
(c) Significant structural alterations by small providers; exception
Small providers are not required by subsection (a) of this section to make signifi-
cant structural alterations to their existing facilities for the purpose of assuring pro-
gram accessibility, if alternative means of providing the services are available. The
terms used in this subsection shall be construed with reference to the regulations
existing on March 22, 1988.
(d) Standards used in determining violation of section
The standards used to determine whether this section has been violated in a
complaint alleging employment discrimination under this section shall be the stan-
dards applied under title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C.
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discrimination aimed at disabled individuals regardless of the nature
of an employer's business or relationship to government.74 Since
there is no federal statute like the ADA, Congress instructed that Re-
habilitation Act analysis be applied to the ADA to the extent both
Acts provide the same protection.7
As with the ADEA, courts interpreting the Rehabilitation Act
have analyzed employment discrimination claims using Title VII
tests. For example, courts have utilized the "McDonnell Douglas"
test 76 in analyzing Rehabilitation Act claims based on the discrimina-
12111 et seq.) and the provisions of sections 501 through 504, and 510, of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12201-12204 and 12210), as such sec-
tions relate to employment.
Id.
74 However, Title I of the ADA, which specifically deals with employment, does have some
limitations in its application. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1211 l(5)(B)(i) (Supp. III 1991), Title I
of the ADA does not apply to the United States government, any corporation wholly owned by
the United States government, or any Indian tribe. Such entities remain covered under the
Rehabilitation Act. It also does not apply to a bona fide private membership club, other than a
labor organization, exempt from taxation under § 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Service Code
of 1986. 42 U.S.C. § 1211 l(5)(B)(ii) (Supp. III 1991). Another significant limitation to the
application of Title I of the ADA relates to the number of employees an employer has. Title I
of the ADA applies only to employers with 25 or more employees until July 26, 1994, when it
will apply to employers with 15 or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (Supp. III 1991).
Significantly, Title II of the ADA, which covers state and local government entities, applies to
employees of such entities who are not covered under the Rehabilitation Act (i.e., not working
in programs receiving federal funding), and claims brought under Title II will be analyzed
under the same standards as those brought under Title I of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-
12165 (Supp. III 1991); see also State and Local Governments, Employment Practices, 1 ADA
Man. (BNA) No. 12, at 25:0002-0003 (Apr. 1992).
75 See EEOC ADA Regulations, supra note 28, app. § 1630.2(g) (noting that Congress
intended relevant Rehabilitation Act case law to apply to the term "disability" under the
ADA), § 1630. 1(c) (except as provided in the ADA, the ADA does not apply a lesser standard
than the Rehabilitation Act). As noted previously in this Article, Title VII analysis should
also be utilized where appropriate. See discussion supra part I.C.I.
76 In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Supreme Court set
forth the requirements for a prima facie case of disparate treatment employment discrimina-
tion in the context of a race discrimination case brought under Title VII. This test provides:
The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under the
statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. This may be
done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that,
despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the
position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from per-
sons of complainant's qualifications.
Id. at 802. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to
articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the rejection. Id. If legitimate non-
discriminatory reasons are set forth, plaintiff must show that the stated reasons are pretexts for
discrimination. Id. at 804.
The test for a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII will vary depending on
the protected class involved and the nature of the discriminatory employment practice. The
Court acknowledged the potential for such variations by the following language:
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tory denial of employment or the emoluments of employment. Simi-
larly, in Taylor v. Garrett," the court noted that Title VII concepts
are often applied to Rehabilitation Act cases.7 8
Since the ADA looks to the Rehabilitation Act as a key source of
interpretive authority for analyzing employment discrimination
claims,79 and the Rehabilitation Act looks to Title VII for interpretive
guidance when the discriminatory conduct involved is protected
against under both statutes, 0 it is reasonable to conclude that the
ADA will also utilize Title VII analysis, modified by applicable Reha-
bilitation Act cases, when the discrimination involved is prohibited by
those statutes. This is consistent with the relationship between the
ADA and Title VII. 8 1
A court analyzing an ADA claim based on workplace harass-
ment might therefore look to the Rehabilitation Act to determine the
appropriateness of the analysis utilized for such claims under that
Act.82 However, as discussed below, there is no uniformity among
the few Rehabilitation Act cases addressing workplace harassment.
As a result, a court would most likely look directly to Title VII in
interpreting such a cause of action under the ADA, because Title VII
law supplies a framework capable of consistent interpretation.
The test for workplace harassment under Title VII is based on
the hostile work environment theory. 83 However, as the ADA is in-
fluenced by both Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act, it is necessary
The facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification above
of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in
every respect to differing factual situations.
Id. at 802 n.13.
The McDonnell Douglas test is primarily used in cases involving the denial of employment
opportunities or related rights and benefits, and termination of employment. The Supreme
Court has set forth a different test for harassment claims by protected individuals. See Meritor
Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-67 (1986).
77 820 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
78 Id. at 939 n.11; see also Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 305 n.19
(5th Cir. 1981) (Title VII jurisprudence is for the most part applicable to intentional social bias
discrimination against the handicapped.).
79 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
80 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
81 See discussion supra part I.C.1.
82 Whether the Rehabilitation Act provides for a harassment cause of action has been ques-
tioned. See James v. Frank, 772 F. Supp. 984 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (court acknowledged that Mr.
James was harassed, but the opinion, and remedy provided therein, focused only on the em-
ployer's failure to reasonably accommodate). However, harassment claims brought under
common law causes of action have been recognized in Rehabilitation Act cases. See discussion
infra this part.
83 See discussion supra part I.A. The application of this test to ADA claims will be dis-
cussed in Part II of this Article, infra. Additionally, quid pro quo harassment, which involves
the conditioning of employment, or the emoluments of employment, on sexual favors, has been
1492
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to address Rehabilitation Act cases that deal with workplace harass-
ment before exploring the application of the hostile work environment
theory to the ADA.
Initially, it should be noted that there are few published cases
brought under the Rehabilitation Act involving claims for workplace
harassment by disabled employees. Of those, the majority involve
claims brought under the common law theories of constructive dis-
charge or intentional infliction of emotional distress. 4 In fact, it has
been questioned whether the Rehabilitation Act even provides relief
for workplace harassment.8 5
However, an analysis of the few Rehabilitation Act cases involv-
ing harassment, even if those cases involved common law theories, is
beneficial to both demonstrate the need for a clear cause of action for
harassment under the ADA, and to define the appropriate test for
that cause of action. The fact that the EEOC has been asked to draft
proposed guidelines on workplace harassment of disabled employees
suggests that the small number of Rehabilitation Act harassment
cases is not indicative of the pervasiveness of such harassment.8 6 Fur-
thermore, it indicates that the ADA was not meant to utilize the com-
mon law theories applied under the Rehabilitation Act in analyzing
harassment claims. 87
The Rehabilitation Act's employment provisions have been uti-
lized primarily to require that employers receiving government funds
recognized under Title VII in the sexual harassment context. See Mentor Sav. Bank v. Vin-
son, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
84 See, e.g., Doe v. Board of County Comm'rs, 815 F. Supp. 1448 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress); Kent by Gillespie v. Derwinski, 790 F. Supp. 1032
(E.D. Wash. 1991) (constructive discharge).
85. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. However, the EEOC Proposed Guidelines
erase any doubt in this area because they apply to cases brought under the Rehabilitation Act.
EEOC Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10.
86 If the existence of a cause of action for workplace harassment against disabled employ-
ees had clearly existed under the Rehabilitation Act, there would likely have been more such
cases. Yet, because the Rehabilitation Act is limited to employees of employers receiving gov-
ernment funding, and because there was no clear pronouncement delineating a hostile work
environment cause of action under the Rehabilitation Act, it is not surprising to see a dearth of
such cases. In fact, one of the most important purposes of the ADA is to clearly define a set of
rights which disabled individuals are entitled to, and which they have been denied in the past.
See supra note 40. Also telling is the fact that the EEOC Proposed Guidelines prohibit work-
place harassment against disabled employees. It would make little sense for the EEOC to draft
guidelines applicable to harassment of disabled employees under the ADA and the Rehabilita-
tion Act if there was no need to.
87 The EEOC Proposed Guidelines provide for a harassment cause of action under the
ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Thus, victims bringing claims under the ADA, and now, the
Rehabilitation Act, do not need to utilize common law concepts. See EEOC Proposed Guide-
lines, supra note 10.
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provide reasonable accommodation to disabled individuals. 88 Because
the focus of the Rehabilitation Act has been on reasonable accommo-
dation and its language is not as broad as that of the ADA regarding
other forms of discrimination,89 claims of harassment brought under
the Rehabilitation Act were usually based on common law theories,
and brought in conjunction with, or pendant to, a claim that an em-
ployer failed to reasonably accommodate. 90 However, the standards
for applicable common law theories such as constructive discharge
and intentional infliction of emotional distress vary by jurisdiction,
and are generally stricter than those applied to hostile work
environment. 91
In Kent by Gillespie v. Derwinski,92 the court held that an emo-
tionally and mentally handicapped employee was constructively dis-
charged, as defined by Ninth Circuit case law, because she was subject
to unnecessary discipline and taunting.93 The court utilized the the-
ory of constructive discharge as part of its Rehabilitation Act analy-
sis, holding that the complainant, under the Rehabilitation Act, had
to prove that she was an otherwise qualified handicapped individual,
and that she was constructively terminated because of her handicap. 94
To prove constructive discharge, the complainant had to demonstrate,
by the totality of the circumstances, that a reasonable person in her
position would have felt that she was forced to quit because of intoler-
able and discriminatory working conditions.95
Conversely, in Johnson v. Shalala,96 the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that an employee failed to establish that she was con-
structively discharged under the test applied in the Fourth Circuit.
88 See James v. Frank, 772 F. Supp. 984 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
89 See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
90 Johnson v. Shalala, 991 F.2d 126 (4th Cir. 1993); Kent by Gillespie v. Derwinski, 790 F.
Supp. 1032 (E.D. Wash. 1991).
91 Common law causes of action such as constructive discharge impose a greater burden on
the complainant than does hostile work environment. See Walter C. Arbery, Note, A Step
Backward for Equality Principles: The "Reasonable Woman" Standard in Title VII Hostile
Work Environment Sexual Harassment Claims, 27 GA. L. REV. 503, 524 (1993) (noting that
constructive discharge claims require a victim of harassment to quit because of the working
conditions, thus focusing on the justification for a complainant's reaction to harassing conduct,
and imposing a greater burden on the complainant than hostile work envirohment which fo-
cuses on the harasser's conduct); see also Peter G. Nash & Jonathan R. Mook, Employee Tort
Actions for Sexual Harassment in Virginia: Negotiating the Liability Mine Field, 1 GEO. MA-
SON U. Civ. RTs. L.J. 247, 250 (1990) (noting that Virginia, like other jurisdictions, has estab-
lished a "very strict" test that must be met to establish an emotional distress claim).
92 790 F. Supp. 1032 (E.D. Wash. 1991).
93 Id. at 1040-41.
94 Id. at 1038-39.
95 Id. at 1040.
96 991 F.2d 126 (4th Cir. 1993).
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Despite evidence that the employer's accommodation attempts were
inadequate under the Rehabilitation Act, the employee failed to state
a claim because constructive discharge in the Fourth Circuit requires
proof that the employer intended to drive the employee from the
job.97
Finally, in Doe v. Board of County Commissioners,98 an employee
alleged that her supervisor intentionally subjected her to harassment
because of her mental handicap. The employer sought to dismiss her
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress which was
brought in conjunction with several other state and federal claims.99
The court noted that Florida recognized the tort of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, and applied the definition set forth in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts,"co holding that the complainant had
made sufficient allegations of intentional harassment by her supervisor
to withstand judgment on the pleadings. 0 1 Nevertheless, to ulti-
mately prevail on her claim, the employee would have to meet the
strict standard for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Thus, prior to the enactment of the ADA, federal courts at-
tempted to provide relief to the victims of disability-based harassment
through common law theories, sometimes incorporating them into
Rehabilitation Act analysis. However, there was no uniformity to the
method in which the common law theories were applied, or the tests
under which such theories were analyzed. If the courts had had the
benefit of a uniform cause of action for harassment under the Rehabil-
itation Act, employers would have been able to take affirmative steps
to avoid illegal harassment, and employees would have had a way to
gauge if the conduct to which they were subject was illegal. Without
a clear rule determining what conduct was illegal, employees facing
97 Id. at 131-32. Such a showing of deliberateness could only be made if the employee
demonstrated the complete failure to accommodate after repeated requests, or through direct
evidence of intent to force the employee from the job. Id. at 132.
98 815 F. Supp. 1448 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
99 Id. at 1449. The court did not state what these state and federal provisions were.
100 Id. at 1450.
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965) provides:
(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes
severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional dis-
tress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.
Id. Additionally, comment (f) to § 46(1) notes that extreme and outrageous conduct
may arise from the actor's knowledge that the other is peculiarly susceptible to
emotional distress, by reason of some physical or mental condition or peculiarity.
The conduct may become heartless, flagrant, and outrageous when the actor pro-
ceeds in the face of such knowledge, where it would not be so if he did not know.
Id. § 46(1) cmt. f.
101 Doe v. Board of County Comm'rs, 815 F. Supp. at 1450.
1994] 1495
HeinOnline -- 15  Cardozo L. Rev.  1495 1993 - 1994
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
similar harassment might have had no remedy under the Rehabilita-
tion Act, 0 2 or an "excellent remedy," 103 depending on the jurisdiction
in which the case was heard."0 4 The necessity of a clearly defined
right to be free from workplace harassment under the ADA, and the
availability of a workable structure applicable to claims enforcing
that right, such as the Title VII structure, is evidenced by the incon-
sistency of the Rehabilitation Act cases involving workplace
harassment.
D. State Discrimination Laws, Hostile Work Environment, and the
Analysis of Disability-Based Employment Discrimination
Claims
1. State Discrimination Laws That Protect Disabled Individuals
All fifty states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have
enacted legislation prohibiting employment discrimination against
disabled individuals. 05 The protection afforded disabled individuals
by these statutes may also apply to other classes, and can range from a
comprehensive prohibition on employment discrimination based on
race, religion, ethnicity, sex, age, disability, and other protected at-
tributes by all employers, public or private,0 6 to those limited to pub-
lic employment that includes fewer protected classes. 10 7 Some states
that prohibit disability-based discrimination analyze claims by dis-
abled individuals under the general statutory scheme applied to all
protected classes, while including provisions relating to the unique
102 See supra note 82.
103 See Kent by Gillespie v. Derwinski, 790 F. Supp. 1032, 1041 (E.D. Wash. 1991) (Courts
may grant the full panoply of remedies, including equitable relief and monetary damages, to
successful plaintiffs under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.).
104 The EEOC Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, apply to the Rehabilitation Act as well
as the ADA, Title VII, and the ADEA. Thus, for those disabled employees not covered by the
ADA, relief is available when they are faced with actionable workplace harassment. See supra
note 74.
105 1 ADA Man. (BNA) No. 18, at 80:i (July 1993) (alphabetical listing by state of legisla-
tion regarding disability discrimination).
106 Good examples of comprehensive discrimination legislation are provided by the Califor-
nia Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900-12996 (Deering 1993),
amended by CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(h)(1) (Deering 1994) (prohibiting discrimination by
public and private employers with five or more employees, on the basis of race, religion, color,
national origin, ancestry, physical, and in some cases mental, disability, medical condition,
marital status, sex, or age), and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J. REV. STAT.
§§ 10:5-1 to 10:5-42 (1993) (prohibiting discrimination by all public and private employers on
the basis of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, affectional or sex-
ual orientation, familial status, sex, present or former handicap, or atypical hereditary cellular
blood trait).
107 An example of a limited state discrimination statute is provided by Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 25-9-103 (1993), which provides protection only in relation to government employment.
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concerns attendant to disability discrimination. 10
2. States That Recognize a Cause of Action for Hostile Work
Environment Under Discrimination Statutes
Several states that provide similar rights to all protected classes
have recognized a cause of action for workplace harassment of indi-
viduals belonging to those protected classes. For example, California
has specifically recognized a cause of action for workplace harassment
under its Fair Employment and Housing Act.109 Other states have
recognized that such a cause of action is inherent in their statutes
even without specific statutory language dealing with harassment, be-
cause those statutes prohibit discrimination in terms and conditions of
employment, and workplace harassment becomes actionable when it
interferes with terms and conditions of employment.110
Most states that recognize a cause of action for workplace har-
assment base their analysis of such claims on the hostile work envi-
ronment theory as developed under Title VII law. However, some
state courts have significantly modified the Title VII test for hostile
work environment.I 2 Regardless of the exact test applied, these state
108 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900-12996 (California Fair Employment and Housing
Act, which applies to several protected classes, including individuals with disabilities); N.J.
REV. STAT. §§ 10:5-1 to 10:5-42 (New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, which applies to
disabled individuals along with several protected classes). For a detailed listing of all state
discrimination laws that prohibit discrimination against individuals with disabilities, see 2
ADA Man. (BNA) No. 18, at 80:i-0310 (July 1993).
109 The California Fair Employment and Housing Act's harassment provision, CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 12940(h), provides in pertinent part that it is an unlawful employment practice:
(1) For an employer, labor organization, employment agency, apprenticeship
training program or any training program leading to employment, or any other
person, because of race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical
disability, mental disability, medical condition, marital status, sex, or age, to har-
ass an employee or applicant. Harassment of an employee or applicant by an em-
ployee other than an agent or supervisor shall be unlawful if the entity, or its
agents or supervisors, knows or should have known of this conduct and fails to
take immediate and appropriate corrective action. An entity shall take all reason-
able steps to prevent harassment from occurring. Loss of tangible job benefits shall
not be necessary in order to establish harassment.
Id. at § 12940(h)(1).
110 See, e.g., Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445 (N.J. 1993) (holding that under
the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, the test for determining the existence of a hostile
work environment in a sexual harassment case is whether the alleged conduct would not have
occurred but for the complainant's gender, and was severe and pervasive enough to make a
reasonable woman believe that the conditions of employment are altered and the working envi-
ronment is hostile or abusive).
I I I See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
112 See, e.g., Lehmann, 626 A.2d at 445.
HeinOnline -- 15  Cardozo L. Rev.  1497 1993 - 1994
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
discrimination statutes provide relief to the members of any class
which they protect.
3. Comprehensive State Discrimination Statutes and the Proper
Construction of the Federal Statutory Scheme
The purpose of many comprehensive state discrimination laws
that protect several classes, including disabled individuals, is to eradi-
cate discrimination against individuals based on their membership in
protected classes. 113 This supports the conclusion that within any
comprehensive statutory scheme aimed at eliminating discrimination,
all protected classes should be afforded the same rights under similar
standards; these state discrimination statutes provide broad protec-
tions to such classes. Similarly, Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA
provide a comprehensive federal statutory scheme aimed at eradicat-
ing discrimination and protecting several classes; each applies similar
analyses to discrimination claims, with the ADA adding concepts
unique to the disability context. The state discrimination statutes
which serve the same purpose as the federal statutes, and provide
remedies for all protected classes, are instructive in analyzing the fed-
eral statutory scheme: they demonstrate the logic in providing all pro-
tected classes the same causes of action, and in allowing for
modifications necessitated by the unique attributes of a given class.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF A CAUSE OF ACTION BASED ON
WORKPLACE HARASSMENT UNDER THE ADA
A. Lessons Learned from the Title VII and EEOC Proposed
Guideline Tests for Workplace Harassment
1. The Need for a Consistent Structure for Workplace Harassment
Claims Under the ADA
The ADA is applicable in all jurisdictions," 4 and many states
113 See id. at 451 (purpose of New Jersey Law Against Discrimination "is nothing less than
the eradication 'of the cancer of discrimination' ") (citing Fuchilla v. Layman, 537 A.2d 652,
660 (N.J. 1988)); Walnut Creek Manor v. Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 814 P.2d
704, 709 (Cal. 1991) (case brought under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act
holding that the eradication of discrimination in housing is a legitimate regulatory purpose);
Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 41
(D.C. 1987) (Newman, J., concurring) (in enacting the District of Columbia Human Rights
Act the legislature spoke with "unmistakable clarity of the importance with which it regards
the eradication of discrimination on the basis of... inappropriate criteria"); Michigan Dep't of
Civil Rights ex rel. Cornell v. Edward A. Sparrow Hosp. Ass'n, 326 N.W.2d 519, 521-25
(Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (MacKenzie, J., dissenting) (among the purposes of the former Michi-
gan State Fair Employment Practice Act was the eiadication of discrimination).
114 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Supp. III 1991).
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will look to ADA law in applying their discrimination laws to dis-
abled individuals. 15 Thus, the structure given to causes of action
under the ADA will have profound implications for the rights of dis-
abled individuals nationwide, both under federal and state law.
The need for consistency in construing ADA harassment claims
can be illustrated by the evolution of the hostile work environment
cause of action. The cause of action was initially recognized by the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Rogers v. EEOC, 116 in the context of
racial discrimination. in 1986, fifteen years after the Rogers decision,
the Supreme Court decided Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,' and
acknowledged the cause of action in the context of sexual harassment.
Significantly, the Court indicated that the cause of action applies to
all classes protected by Title VII.1 18
Prior to Meritor, there was no clear rule as to whether a cause of
action for workplace harassment that did not impinge on an em-
ployee's pecuniary interest existed, and thus no uniform structure for
workplace harassment claims.1 19 The EEOC had issued Guidelines
regarding sexual harassment, 20 but they were subject to different in-
terpretations or simply not followed.121 In Meritor, the Supreme
Court applied parts of the EEOC Guidelines dealing with sexual har-
assment, but acknowledged that they were not binding as promul-
115 That many states will look to ADA law in applying their discrimination laws to disabled
employees is indicated by the fact that state courts have looked to the Rehabilitation Act in
determining the rights and duties their state statutes create regarding employment of disabled
individuals. See Padilla v. City of Topeka, 708 P.2d 543, 551 (Kan. 1985) (Although phrased
differently between federal and Kansas legislation, the basic concept of handicap is similar.);
Bauer v. Republic Airlines, Inc., 442 N.W.2d 818, 820 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (Definition of
"handicapped individual" under Rehabilitation Act is appropriately applied to the Minnesota
Human Rights Act.); Smith v. Ortiz, 517 N.Y3S.2d 352, 354 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (both New York
statute and Rehabilitation Act prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of a disability
which does not impede reasonable employee job performance); Braun v. American Int'l Health
& Rehabilitation Servs., Inc., 846 P.2d 1151, 1154-55 (Or. 1993) (Oregon statutes prohibiting
employers from discriminating against disabled persons are in conformity with the Rehabilita-
tion Act.); Coffman v. West Virginia Bd. of Regents, 386 S.E.2d 1, 8 (W. Va. 1988) (Miller, J.,
dissenting) (West Virginia statute "parallels" to a substantial degree the Rehabilitation Act.).
116 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971) (discrimination against a Hispanic employee), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 957 (1972).
117 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
118 Id. at 66.
119 See id. at 67-68 (in Meritor, the district court believed no claim for sexual harassment
was actionable if it had no economic impact on the victim's employment).
120 EEOC Guidelines on Sex Discrimination, supra note 25.
121 In Meritor, 477 U.S. at 71, the Court noted that even the EEOC advocated a position
which was "in some tension with the EEOC Guidelines." For a detailed discussion of the
interpretations given EEOC guidelines, including the Supreme Court's rejection of some guide-
line provisions, see John S. Moot, Comment, An Analysis of Judicial Deference to EEOC Inter-
pretive Guidelines, I ADMIN. L.J. 213 (1987).
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gated rules, 122 and in fact did not follow the Guidelines as to
employer liability for the acts of supervisors. 21
After Meritor, courts applied various structures to hostile work
environment claims;124 they agreed on the basic framework underly-
ing the cause of action, but applied different standards to it. Thus,
employers and employees had no consistent interpretation regarding
their rights and duties in relation to hostile work environment. Even-
tually, a general structure evolved, based on Meritor, which most ju-
risdictions accepted, 125 but there were still many issues that required
clarification. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. was a recent attempt by
the Supreme Court to clarify some of these issues, while reaffirming
Meritor and noting the imprecise nature of the structure for hostile
work environment claims. 126
In interpreting workplace harassment claims under the ADA, we
have the benefit of hindsight attained during the evolution of the hos-
tile work environment cause of action under Title VII. If a consistent
structure is not created for ADA harassment claims, or the structure
created is not precise, the cost to employers, individual employees,
and judicial resources will be unnecessarily high. The hostile work
environment cause of action provides such a structure, but appropri-
ate modifications, as discussed in Part II.B. of this Article, must be
incorporated into the current framework due to the unique needs of
individuals with disabilities.
2. The Title VII Structure for Hostile Work Environment Claims
as Interpreted by the EEOC Proposed Guidelines
Title VII analysis of hostile work environment claims is applica-
ble to the basic structure of that cause of action under the ADA.
Most courts agree on the general analysis to be used in a hostile work
environment claim under Title VII, although there are some varia-
tions regarding the exact test utilized. 127 The standard for a Title VII
hostile work environment claim based on sexual harassment was most
recently articulated in Harris.28  To prevail on a claim of hostile
122 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
123 Id. at 70-72.
124 See cases cited supra note 35.
125 See discussion infra part II.A.2.
126 114 S. Ct. 367, 370-71 (1993). See also supra note 37 for a discussion of the Harris
opinion.
127 See cases cited supra note 35. Some of these variations were clarified in Harris, but the
reasonable person standard set forth in Harris could be subject to varied interpretations as
well. See supra note 37. Thus, even if the test to be applied to hostile work environment
claims under Title VII is now uniform, the appropriate application of that test is still unclear.
128 Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370-71.
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work environment, an employee must show that she was subject to
conduct which a reasonable person would consider sufficiently severe
or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment, and create a
hostile or abusive working environment.I29 The Harris Court also
held that the complainant must have subjectively perceived the envi-
ronment to be abusive. 30 However, it is not necessary that a com-
plainant's psychological well-being be affected or that she suffer
injury.' The structure applied to hostile work environment claims
pursuant to Harris reaffirms and augments the framework set forth in
Meritor. 3 2
As stated earlier, the EEOC issued Proposed Guidelines on har-
assment 33 which relied heavily upon both Meritor and Ellison v.
Brady.13 4 Accordingly, the general framework set forth in the Pro-
posed Guidelines closely resembles the Title VII cause of action for
hostile work environment. The Proposed Guidelines provide in part:
(a) Harassment on the basis of race, color, religion, gender,
national origin, age, or disability constitutes discrimination in the
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment and, as such, vio-
lates title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42
U.S.C. 2000e et seq. (title VII); the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq. (ADEA); the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. (ADA); or the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq., as
applicable.
(b)(l) Harassment is verbal or physical conduct that deni-
grates or shows hostility or aversion toward an individual because
of his/her race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, or disa-
bility, or that of his/her relatives, friends, or associates, and that:
(i) Has the purpose or effect of creating an intimi-
dating, hostile, or offensive work environment;
(ii) Has the purpose or effect of unreasonably inter-
fering with an individual's work performance; or
(iii) Otherwise adversely affects an individual's em-
ployment opportunities.
(c) The standard for determining whether verbal or physical
129 Id. at 370.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 370-71.
132 Id.; see also Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (harassment is actiona-
ble when it is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create
an abusive working environment).
133 EEOC Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10.
134 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
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conduct relating to race, color, religion, gender, national origin,
age, or disability is sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hos-
tile or abusive work environment is whether a reasonable person in
the same or similar circumstances would find the conduct intimi-
dating, hostile, or abusive. The "reasonable person" standard in-
cludes consideration of the perspective of persons of the alleged
victim's race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, or disa-
bility. It is not necessary to make an additional showing of psycho-
logical harm."13
Thus, according to the EEOC Proposed Guidelines, harassment of
employees belonging to classes protected by Title VII, the ADEA, the
ADA, or the Rehabilitation Act constitutes discrimination in the
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment under those statutes.
For a claim to be actionable, however, such harassment must be se-
vere and pervasive enough that a reasonable person in the same or
similar circumstances as the alleged victim would find the conduct
intimidating, hostile, or abusive.
While the EEOC Proposed Guidelines are a good starting point
for analysis of the appropriate structure to be applied to harassment
claims under the ADA, they do not properly address issues raised by
the specific language of the ADA and the unique circumstances of
disabled individuals.'36 Additionally, the EEOC Proposed Guidelines
need to be streamlined to create a workable cause of action, capable of
consistent interpretation by courts.' 37
135 EEOC Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at 51,268 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1609.1). The lack of necessity to show psychological harm was recently accepted by the
Supreme Court in Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 367.
136 The EEOC has attempted to apply the same guidelines to such diverse classes as race,
color, religion, gender, national origin, and age,' as well as disability. See EEOC Proposed
Guidelines, supra note 10.
137 To some extent, this might occur through the hearing process the EEOC has initiated in
relation to the Proposed Guidelines. Individuals will have sixty days from the date of publica-
tion of the proposed guidelines to comment and make suggestions regarding them. See id at
explanatory note. Thus, the EEOC might revise the Guidelines to some extent. However,
whatever the EEOC does to the Proposed Guidelines, the structure set forth in this Article will
remain viable. If the EEOC adopts the ideas set forth herein, or similar theories, then the
analysis of this Article can be used to support the applications of the EEOC Guidelines, which
as noted earlier in this Article are not binding precedent. See supra note 125 and accompany-
ing text. If the EEOC does not substantially alter the Proposed Guidelines, or alters them in a
manner different from that proposed herein, to the extent this Article agrees with them it can
be used to support their application, and to the extent it differs, it will be a reference point for
courts wishing to modify, augment, or change them.
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B. Proposed Modifications to the Title VII and EEOC Proposed
Guideline Tests for Hostile Work Environment Claims as
Applied to the ADA
1. A Complainant Must Be a Qualified Individual with a Disability
as Defined by the ADA
Title I of the ADA prohibits employment discrimination against
any qualified individual with a disability, or against a qualified indi-
vidual because of the known disability of a person with whom that
qualified individual has a relationship or association. 38 An individual
is disabled for purposes of the ADA if he or she has a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities, a record of such impairment, or is regarded as having such
impairment.139 A qualified individual with a disability is defined as
"an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable ac-
commodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires.''40
In order to have the benefit of the prohibition against employ-
ment discrimination in the terms, conditions, and privileges of em-
ployment provided by Title. I of the ADA, an employee or job
applicant must first show that he or she is a qualified individual with a
disability.
The first requirement of a prima facie case of hostile work envi-
ronment under the ADA-that the alleged victim be a qualified indi-
vidual with a disability-is not addressed in the EEOC Proposed
Guidelines, but courts would likely apply this requirement in conjunc-
tion with the Proposed Guidelines or any other test for hostile work
environment. 4' The concept is also not addressed under the Title
VII test for hostile work environment because it is unique to disability
discrimination, and thus inapplicable to other protected classes.
2. The Objective Reasonableness Standard
As noted above, the Supreme Court, interpreting Title VII, has
held that, in order to make out a prima facie case of hostile work
environment in the sexual harassment context, an alleged victim must
demonstrate that a reasonable person would consider the conduct al-
leged sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the conditions of em-
138 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (Supp. III 1991). Additionally, the ADA protects individuals who
are discriminated against based on a perceived disability, even when the victim does not have
such disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. III 1991).
139 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. III 1991).
140 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. III 1991).
141 EEOC Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10.
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ployment, and create a hostile or abusive working environment. 42
The EEOC Proposed Guidelines modify the reasonable person stan-
dard, propounding instead a "reasonable person in the same or simi-
lar circumstances" standard.143 Although the EEOC proposed
standard is generally well thought out, it invites inconsistent interpre-
tation, and a modified version would be more appropriate.
Additionally, the EEOC Proposed Guidelines alter the structure
of the Title VII test, requiring only that the alleged conduct be suffi-
ciently severe and pervasive that a reasonable person in the same or
similar circumstances would find the conduct intimidating, hostile, or
abusive. 1" The proposed standard fails to directly reference the basis
for a hostile work environment claim: conduct that alters the terms
and conditions of employment. 145 However, interference with the
terms and conditions of employment is mentioned in a separate sec-
tion of the Proposed Guidelines. 146 Hence, although disjointed, both
the prerequisite under Title VII that the terms and conditions of em-
ployment be affected, and the requirement that the conduct affecting
those terms and conditions be severe and pervasive enough to affect a
reasonable person in the alleged victim's class, are included in the
EEOC Proposed Guidelines.
To avoid the possibility of confusion by the numerous courts that
will likely encounter hostile work environment claims by disabled
individuals, particularly those courts that do not deal with such con-
cepts on a regular basis, the structure of the cause of action must be
framed in a clear and coherent fashion, one that is not easily subject
to misinterpretation. Thus, an appropriate standard for ADA hostile
work environment claims must consider both the structure proposed
in Harris'47 and the variation of the reasonable person standard set
forth in the EEOC Proposed Guidelines,'48 with appropriate
modifications.
I therefore contend that the proper structure for analyzing a hos-
tile work environment cause of action under the ADA should be (1)
whether the alleged victim is a qualified individual with a disability,
and (2) whether the individual was, or is, subject to intimidating, hos-
tile, or abusive conduct based on a known disability, which that indi-
142 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993).
143 EEOC Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at 51,269 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1609.1 (c)).
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 51,268 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609.1(a)).
147 See discussion supra part II.A.2, note 126 and accompanying text.
148 See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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vidual perceived, and a reasonable person with the same disability
would consider, sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, thereby creating a hostile or abu-
sive work environment. 149 The victim's psychological well-being need
not be affected nor must the victim suffer injury for the conduct to be
actionable. The EEOC Proposed Guidelines provide guidance in de-
termining whether the conduct alleged is intimidating, hostile, or
abusive. ' 50
This Proposal utilizes the unique provisions of the ADA, the
structure for hostile work environment claims provided by Title VII
law, and the definition of conduct necessary to create a hostile work
environment claim under the ADA as set forth in the EEOC Pro-
posed Guidelines. Significantly, it also advocates a "reasonable per-
son with the same disability" standard in lieu of either the EEOC's
proposed "reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances"
standard or a general "reasonable person" standard. The reason for
this is that both the EEOC proposed standard, and the reasonable
person standard, are too imprecise to be uniformly applied,' 5 ' and
149 When the alleged victim is claiming he or she was discriminated against because of
a relationship or association with a disabled individual pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4)
(Supp. III 1991), the test should be modified as follows:
Whether the alleged victim is related to, or associated with, a disabled individual,
and as a result of that association or relationship was, or is, subject to intimidating,
hostile or abusive conduct which that individual perceived, and a reasonable per-
son in the same circumstances would consider, sufficiently severe and pervasive so
as to alter the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, thereby creating a
hostile or abusive work environment.
Thus, the structure suggested for a claim by a relative or associate'of a disabled person
utilizes the reasonable person in the same circumstances standard. However, for the same
reasons set forth supra note 23, the term "similar circumstances" in the EEOC Proposed
Guidelines, supra note 10, at 51,269 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609.1(c)), is not utilized.
15o In this regard, subsection (b) of the EEOC Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at
51,269 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609.1 (b)(2)), is instructive. The second paragraph of
subsection (b) provides:
(2) Harassing conduct includes, but is not limited to, the following:
(i) Epithets, slurs, negative stereotyping, or threatening, intimidating, or hos-
tile acts, that relate to race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, or disabil-
ity; and
(ii) Written or graphic material that denigrates or shows hostility or aversion
toward an individual or group because of race, color, religion, gender, national
origin, age, or disability and that is placed on the walls, bulletin boards, or else-
where on the employer's premises, or circulated in the workplace.
Id.
151 The EEOC proposed reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances standard
appears to mean reasonable person with the same disability because the second line of pro-
posed § 1609.1(c) reads:
The "reasonable person" standard includes consideration of the perspective of per-
sons of the alleged victim's race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, or
disability.
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while an inflexible standard is inappropriate, 2 the need for precision
was demonstrated in the sexual harassment context by the confusion
over the appropriate reasonableness standard to be applied to Title
VII hostile work environment claims.1 53
One can interpret "reasonable person in the same or similar cir-
cumstances" or "reasonable person" in several ways as they relate to
disabled individuals. They could mean, as I propose, a reasonable
person with the same disability. However, they could also mean any
reasonable disabled individual, any individual with a disability affect-
ing the same major life function or functions affected by the victim's
disability, or any reasonable nondisabled person's perception of how
he or she would react if he or she were in the same or similar circum-
stances as the alleged victim.1 54 Thus, courts could take years to de-
velop a consistent standard upon which employers and employees can
rely.
The "reasonable person with the same disability" standard delin-
eates exactly what test should be applied, and takes the unique aspects
of various disabilities, and the perceptions and sensitivities of those
who live with them, into consideration. Therefore, a blind individ-
ual's claim would be considered in the context of a reasonable blind
person, that of a deaf person in the context of a reasonable hearing-
impaired person, and so on. When an individual falls into more than
one disability classification, but the conduct alleged is aimed at either
Id. at 51,269 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609. l(c)). However, if reasonable person with the
same disability is meant, then that is what should be stated. The standard the EEOC proposes
is easily subject to divergent interpretations. See supra note 23. It is likely that the EEOC
proposed reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances standard is worded the way it
is because the proposed guidelines apply to several protected classes, not just disabled individu-
als, and the standard lends itself well to some of the other classes. However, a distinction
should be made between the standards applied to other classes referred to in the EEOC Pro-
posed Guidelines and those applied to disabled individuals. The same concerns apply to the
reasonable person standard set forth in Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993),
which could be subject to varied interpretations, see supra note 37 (discussing Harris holding,
including the reasonable person standard), and which did not discuss the appropriate reasona-
bleness standard to be applied in the disability context. For a discussion of why the reasonable
person standard set forth in Harris is likely inapplicable to the ADA and the Rehabilitation
Act, see supra note 24.
152 See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 n. 12 (9th Cir. 1991) (acknowledging that the
views of reasonable women might change, and thus so can the standard, because the reasona-
bleness inquiry is not static).
153 See supra note 23.
154 The EEOC Proposed Guidelines note that the standard "includes consideration" of the
perspective of persons with the same disability as the alleged victim. EEOC Proposed Guide-
lines, supra note 10, at 51,269 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609.1(c)). However, as noted
supra note 151, even this point of clarification is insufficient to create a consistent interpreta-
tion of the standard, because "includes consideration" is nebulous and leaves open many possi-
ble interpretations of the standard.
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the more general or narrow classification, the standard is flexible
enough to account for the variation. For example, if a quadriplegic is
subject to the same harassment as a paraplegic, evidence regarding a
reasonable paraplegic or quadriplegic could be used interchangeably.
Conversely, if the alleged victim is totally deaf, and conduct is aimed
at him because he is totally deaf, while other individuals who are not
totally deaf but are hearing impaired are not victimized, or perhaps
even take part in the conduct, the standard of the reasonable hearing-
impaired individual could be refined to reasonable person with total
hearing loss.
Obtaining evidence with which to analyze the perceptions of a
reasonable individual with a given disability should not be an obstacle
to the application of a test taking those unique perceptions into con-
sideration. There are numerous organizations that exist to help indi-
viduals with disabilities which could be utilized as resources. 155
Additionally, there have been many psychological studies involving
the sensitivities and needs of disabled individuals which would also be
excellent resources. 1 6 Even if no such assistance is available, individ-
uals with a given disability could testify, or parties could utilize an
independent research organization involved with the specific disability
to survey the perceptions of individuals with that disability. 1 7 If an
155 See supra note 23.
156 Id.
157 Surveys can be utilized in determining the perceptions of individuals in a protected class
in regard to harassing conduct. In the sexual harassment context, courts have noted the avail-
ability and probative value of surveys in determining female perceptions of work environ-
ments. In Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991), the
court found that the evidence set forth by the plaintiff supported her hostile work environment
claim. In so holding, the court looked carefully at the evidence presented. That evidence
included the expert testimony of a consultant on women and work environments. Id. at 1505-
06. The court noted that the expert
testified that the differential perception of sexual harassment is borne out by her
own experiences and survey research. A study of federal employees by the Merit
Systems Protection Board found that 11 to 12 percent more women than men
characterized sexual remarks or materials of a sexual nature in the workplace as
sexual harassment. Regarding the second of these categories, which consisted of
letters, calls and materials of a sexual nature, including materials depicting sexu-
ally provocative poses, nude, and partially nude pictures, 87 percent of the women
considered this behavior to constitute sexual harassment, in contrast to 76 percent
of the men.
Id. at 1507 (trial transcript citations omitted).
Likewise, in Volk v. Coler, 638 F. Supp. 1555, 1560 (C.D. Ill. 1986), rev'd in part, 845
F.2d 1422 (7th Cir. 1988), the court took notice of informal survey data showing that seventy
percent of the women surveyed had encountered some sort of sexual harassment in their work
environment. However, in that case the court found the plaintiff failed to prove she was the
victim of a hostile work environment. Id. The existence of the survey data mentioned in
Robinson and Volk suggests that the perceptions of members of a definable class regarding
harassment aimed at class members can be ascertained through the use of survey evidence. Of
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individual suffers from a disability so rare that no method of obtaining
insight into the perceptions of a reasonable person with that same dis-
ability is practical, the court should consider the perceptions of the
actual victim in light of the perceptions of a reasonable person with a
disability affecting the same major life function or functions as are
affected by the victim's disability.
Even in circumstances where it would be hard to apply the rea-
sonable person with the same disability standard, a more general stan-
dard that does not account for the different sensitivities associated
with various disabilities should not be applied. Such a standard disre-
gards the basic requirement of the ADA-that all qualified individu-
als with disabilities be afforded protection under the Act-by lumping
all disabled individuals into a group and ignoring the different sensi-
tivities attendant to the various disabilities covered by the ADA. For
example, an epileptic might be no more offended than any other em-
ployee by conduct aimed at a paraplegic, and it would be inappropri-
ate under the ADA not to consider the effect such conduct actually
has on the paraplegic employee if it alters his terms or conditions of
employment.
In Ellison v. Brady,"'5 the court discussed a similar concern in
the context of sexual harassment. Holding that a reasonable person
standard does not sufficiently consider the unique sensitivities of wo-
men, the court opined that a "reasonable woman" standard is neces-
sary to preclude the perpetuation of conduct that women find
offensive, because men, who do not share the same sensitivities as wo-
men, may not find the same conduct offensive."5 9 Likewise, a stan-
dard that does not account for the specific disability of an alleged
victim of harassment does not properly consider the unique sensitivi-
ties of such an individual, and could lead to the perpetuation of con-
duct that individuals without disabilities, or individuals with other
disabilities, do not find offensive, but which a reasonable person with
the alleged victim's disability would. Such a construction is inconsis-
course, the weight to be given such surveys, and their value in determining how a "reasonable"
person or member of that class would react to the conduct alleged in a given case, would need
to be argued by the party propounding such evidence.
158 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
159 Id. at 879-81. Harris rejected an explicit reasonable woman standard, and applied a
reasonable person standard, but that standard may indeed mean reasonable woman when the
victim is female for the reasons set forth in Ellison and in supra note 37 of this Article. Re-
gardless of the appropriate standard under Title VII, the reasoning set forth in Ellison for the
standard applies as well in the disability context where courts have noted the variety of disabil-
ities protected, see Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 307 (5th Cir. 1981), and
that most people are not in a position to determine what a reasonable person with a specific
disability would find hostile or abusive. See supra note 24.
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tent with the command of the ADA, that any qualified individual
with a disability be protected in the terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment.160
Of course, the standard proposed herein does not mandate that
sensitivities common to all disabled individuals be ignored, only that
they be considered in the context of the specific disability in question,
and the added sensitivities created thereby. Thus, while it is conceiva-
ble that a working environment may be hostile to individuals with one
specific disability, but not to individuals with other disabilities, if all
disabled individuals in a work environment feel it is hostile toward
them because of discrimination aimed at only one or a few disabled
individuals, the standard is equally useful since, as long as a reason-
able individual with the same disability as an alleged victim would
have found the conduct sufficiently severe or pervasive, the standard
will be met.
3. Consideration of Reasonable Accommodation in the ADA Hostile
Work Environment Structure
The duty to reasonably accommodate an employee and thereby
enable that employee to perform his or her job is a concept unique to
disability discrimination law.1 61 Failure to accommodate by itself will
rarely be sufficient to create a hostile work environment, and it need
not be alleged to state a claim for hostile work environment under the
ADA. 62 The ADA protects any qualified individual with a disabil-
ity, regardless of whether that person requires accommodation.' 63
This does not mean that reasonable accommodation cannot be
considered in connection with a hostile work environment claim
160 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (Supp. III 1991).
161 The duty to reasonably accommodate is mandated both by the ADA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(5) (Supp. III 1991), and the Rehabilitation Act, supra note 17, § 794(d) (utilizing
the standards for employment discrimination set forth in Title I of the ADA). However, it
should be noted that the term "reasonable accommodation" has applicability in contexts
outside of disability discrimination law. For example, employers have a duty to reasonably
accommodate the religious practices of employees under Title VII. See Ansonia Bd. of Educ.
v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986) (discussing the requirement of section 701(j) of Title VII
regarding an employer's obligation to accommodate the religious observances of employees).
The duty to reasonably accommodate a disabled employee is unique in that such accommoda-
tion is required to enable the employee to perform his or her job. The accommodation of
religious observances by an employer does not enable that employee to perform the job; it
simply acknowledges that employees have a right to observe their religious beliefs without
being discriminated against in employment to the extent that such observance does not impose
an undue hardship on the employer. Id. at 68-69.
162 The EEOC Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, provide for a harassment cause of ac-
tion that does not require an allegation that an employer failed to reasonably accommodate.
Likewise, the standard set forth in this Article does not require such an allegation.
163 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. III 1991).
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under the ADA. Failure to reasonably accommodate can contribute
to a hostile work environment, or in rare situations, even create such
an environment.' 64 When failure to reasonably accommodate is al-
leged in conjunction with a hostile work environment claim, it should
be incorporated as evidence relating to the severity and pervasiveness
of the alleged conduct. A valid hostile work environment claim
would therefore exist if a reasonable person with the same disability
would have found the totality of the conduct alleged-including fail-
ure to reasonably accommodate-sufficiently severe and pervasive to
alter the conditions of employment and create an intimidating, hos-
tile, or abusive work environment.' 65
Because failure to reasonably accommodate under appropriate
circumstances can be considered intimidating, hostile, or even abu-
sive, it can contribute to a hostile work environment. 66 Consider an
employee with a mental disability who requires extra sensitivity from
her employer to properly perform the essential functions of her job,
but instead, the employer ridicules and unnecessarily disciplines her,
without providing appropriate supervision.' 67 Under such circum-
stances, the employer's conduct toward the employee might create, or
contribute to, a hostile work environment. Moreover, the failure to
accommodate by not providing appropriate supervision might also be
perceived by a reasonable employee with the victim's disability as
hostile or intimidating conduct contributing to a hostile work
environment.
Failure to accommodate can also increase an employee's discom-
fort in the work environment by physically placing the employee in or
near an area that exposes the employee to conduct that creates a hos-
tile work environment. For example, suppose an employee requires
an unusually large chair because of a chronic back disability about
which he is self-conscious. Locating the employee's work station in
the middle of a common area where the chair would clearly be no-
ticed, instead of in an area with less office traffic, could lead to ridicule
that he would not have faced in another location. 6 Despite the em-
164 See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 168-70, 177.
165 The "totality of the circumstances" for the conduct alleged standard is logical given the
nature of hostile work environment claims, and is set forth in the EEOC Proposed Guidelines,
supra note 10, at 51,269 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609.1(e)).
166 See id. at 51,269 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609.1(c)) and discussion supra part II.A.
167 See Kent by Gillespie v. Derwinski, 790 F. Supp. 1032 (E.D. Wash. 1991).
168 Relocation of disabled employees has been deemed an appropriate accommodation in
the Rehabilitation Act context. In Arneson v. Sullivan, 946 F.2d 90 (8th Cir. 1991), the court
found that an employee suffering from apraxia, a disease which among other things causes
distractibility, was a qualified individual with a disability, and set forth the appropriate accom-
modations for the employee. To accommodate the employee's distractibility the court sug-
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ployer's accommodation of providing the chair, the employee might
have a hostile work environment claim if he is ridiculed, because the
accommodation, as effectuated, facilitated the ridicule that created
the hostile work environment. 69 Moreover, the effects of that ridi-
cule might be compounded because he feels conspicuous. If the em-
ployee were placed in the less conspicuous area, whatever conduct he
did face might not be considered sufficiently severe or pervasive to
create a hostile work environment. 170 At the very least, the manner of
effectuating the accommodation would not have contributed to the
creation of a hostile work environment.
One can also imagine situations where failure to accommodate
by itself is sufficient to be the primary cause of a hostile work environ-
ment. While such situations will probably be rare, the possibility
must be acknowledged.
For instance, consider an individual with a respiratory disorder
such as emphysema, who works in a smoke-filled environment, and
requests several times to be moved to a room with a separate ventila-
tion system because the smoke interferes with her ability to work, and
coworkers intentionally smoke more when she is present. She has
made her requests in writing to company officers at several levels, but
gested the employer expend a reasonable amount to "provide a distraction-free" work
environment for him. Id. at 92-93. The court noted that past experience with the employee
demonstrated that "a reasonable effort to isolate" the employee from distractions enabled him
to perform his job satisfactorily. Id. at 92. If an employee likewise requests relocation to avoid
embarrassment and harassment resulting from a disability or related accommodation, an em-
ployer should do so-regardless of whether such relocation is necessary to reasonably accom-
modate the employee. The employer otherwise risks liability for hostile work environment if
he provides a valid accommodation that nonetheless subjects the employee to added harass-
ment, and such accommodation might not be considered reasonable under the circumstances.
See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
169 An example of a situation where the effectuation of an accommodation caused harass-
ment is provided by James v. Frank, 772 F. Supp. 984 (S.D. Ohio 1991). In James, a chair was
provided to an employee who suffered from problems related to an amputation. The chair was
consistently taken by unknown persons, even after the employee attempted to chain it down.
In one instance, the employee found his chair on a truck bound for New Jersey. Id. at 991.
The court noted that management, which had been hostile to the employee in the past, made
no efforts to insure that the accommodation as effectuated would not be taken. It analyzed the
situation only under the reasonable accommodation theory, and found that, because there was
no proof that management was involved in taking the chair, such taking did not constitute
failure to accommodate. Id. However, for other reasons, the court found that the employer
failed to reasonably accommodate the employee. Id. at 991-92. James demonstrates the type
of situation where the effectuation of an accommodation can help create a hostile work envi-
ronment, and if the court had analyzed the situation under a hostile work environment theory,
it might have found actionable harassment.
170 The accommodation referred to would also be relevant to employer liability, and the
defenses thereto, as set forth in discussion infra part III. Even if the accommodation did not
preclude a hostile work environment it might preclude or dilute employer liability, and allow
the employer to invoke the limited good faith defense. See infra part III.
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receives no response. Failure to provide the requested accommoda-
tion, or another reasonable accommodation, could create a hostile
work environment, regardless of whether the conduct of her coem-
ployees is considered.' The smoke-filled office itself interferes with
her ability to work due to her disability and that situation is intention-
ally exacerbated when she is present.
Requiring the employee to remain in that environment subjects
her to added exposure to smoke because her coworkers smoke more
when she is present, and such exposure worsens the employee's condi-
tion. Thus, it is possible that a reasonable employee with the com-
plainant's disability would believe the employer's conduct in not
providing the requested accommodation under the circumstances was
sufficiently severe and pervasive to create a hostile or abusive working
environment.
Under such circumstances, failure to accommodate merges into
the concept of hostile work environment, because the accommodation
requested is removal from the work environment, the conditions in
that work environment interfere with the terms and conditions of em-
ployment, and such removal would end the effects of the hostile work
environment. 7 2 Of course, if the coworkers ridicule the employee af-
ter she is relocated, a claim for hostile work environment might still
arise.
Significantly, accommodating the employee's request to move
from a smoke-filled office is not the same as transferring the victim of
workplace harassment to a different work location, while allowing the
171 In cases not involving harassment, the reasonableness of accommodations for employees
with respiratory disorders working in smoke-filled environments have been considered. In
Vickers v. Veterans Admin., 549 F. Supp. 85 (W.D. Wash. 1982), the employer was found to
have accommodated an employee hypersensitive to tobacco smoke by securing a voluntary
agreement not to smoke in the employee's office and the adjacent office, installing vents,
purchasing an air purifier, and offering additional accommodations such as construction of a
floor-to-ceiling partition around the employee's work area, movement of the employee's desk,
and assignment to an outside job.
In County of Fresno v. Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 277 Cal. Rptr. 557 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1991), the court considered a claim brought under California's Fair Employment and
Housing Act, which looks to Rehabilitation Act law as guidance, and held that movement of
employees with respiratory disorders to a separate room is an insufficient accommodation if
the environment is so smoke polluted that only a ban on smoking could abate the smoke
problem. Id. at 566.
172 The employee might also argue that the conduct of the smokers created the hostile work
environment, because they smoked more when she was present, and that the employer's failure
to accommodate creates vicarious liability under the test set forth in part III, infra. The fail-
ure to accommodate could demonstrate that the employer failed to take immediate and appro-
priate remedial action. Id. at part III. This would be the better approach if the evidence did
not demonstrate that the employer's conduct in not providing the accommodation created a
hostile or abusive working environment.
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harasser to remain, in an attempt to alleviate the harassment. 1 3
Courts have held that such transfers violate Title VII because they
punish the victim for the harasser's conduct. 174 This analysis is also
applicable in the ADA context, 175 but because the transfer from the
smoke-filled office situation would be a reasonable accommodation re-
quested by the harassment victim, it would not violate the ADA.
Likewise, the situation involving the employee with emphysema
is distinguishable from other situations, such as where the accommo-
dation is a change in desk location.176 The smoking situation is differ-
ent in that the environment itself is hostile to the employee because of
her disability, and failure to accommodate her aggravates both the
work environment and the disability. In the other situation, it is the
employee's location in the environment that causes others to ridicule
him, but the environment itself is not dangerous to the employee.
Thus, the failure to accommodate does not create the hostile work
environment, but enables others to do S0.17 However, in both scena-
rios the accommodation should be granted to help avoid hostile work
environment liability.
Where failure to accommodate is not alleged in connection with
a hostile work environment claim, the general test set forth in this
Article should apply. 7  To comply with the duty to prevent the
creation of a hostile work environment, employers should provide ad-
equate policies and training for coworkers and supervisors. 79 Argua-
bly, when an employee puts an employer on notice about a hostile
work environment, the employer's failure to adequately deal with that
situation, or to implement appropriate policies, could be deemed fail-
ure to reasonably accommodate if the resulting hostile work environ-
173 See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 882 (9th Cir. 1991) (opining that it is inappropriate
to transfer the victim of harassment to a less desirable location to alleviate the harassment).
174 See, e.g., id.
175 See discussion supra part I.C.1 (regarding the applicability of Title VII law to ADA
claims).
176 See supra text accompanying notes 168-70.
177 One could argue that the same is true of the smoke-filled environment hypothetical,
because the victim's location near coemployees who intentionally smoke more around her en-
ables those coemployees to create a hostile work environment. However, the hostile work
environment could be created even if the coemployees did not smoke more around the victim,
but merely smoked heavily throughout the day. Additionally, the smoke-filled work environ-
ment is the primary cause of the victim's complaints, and the extra smoke caused by inten-
tional conduct of coemployees aimed at the victim does not create the hostile work
environment, it only exacerbates it.
178 See discussion supra part II.B.2.
179 EEOC Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at 51,269 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1609.2(d)).
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ment prevents employees from performing essential job functions.'
III. EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT
UNDER THE ADA
A. The General Standard of Employer Liability for Conduct That
Creates a Hostile Work Environment
Employer liability for conduct that creates a hostile work envi-
ronment has been addressed by both the EEOC and the courts. The
EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex suggest that em-
ployers are strictly liable for the conduct of their agents and supervi-
sors, and should be held liable for the conduct of coworkers if the
employer knew or should have known of the conduct, yet failed to
take adequate remedial action.'' In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,
the Supreme Court rejected the strict liability standard, holding that
general agency principles should be utilized to determine employer
liability for the conduct of supervisors.112  Some courts have ad-
dressed the issue of liability for the conduct of nonsupervisory em-
ployees, generally holding that employers should be liable for the
conduct of coworkers, where they knew or should have known of the
conduct and failed to take appropriate remedial action as set forth by
the EEOC.'83 Other courts have modified these principles in analyz-
ing hostile work environment claims brought under state discrimina-
tion statutes. 84
The EEOC Proposed Guidelines would make an employer liable
for its conduct and that of its agents and supervisory employees,
where the supervisory employee alleged to be the harasser is acting in
180 However, it is unnecessary to analyze this issue in depth, because the cause of action for
hostile work environment is available to a qualified individual with a disability whether or not
that environment itself prevents the employee from performing the essential functions of the
job. See discussion supra part II.B.2 (setting forth test).
181 EEOC Guidelines on Sex Discrimination, supra note 25, § 1604.11 (c), (d).
182 477 U.S. 57, 69-73 (1986).
183 See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881-83 (9th Cir. 1991) (looked to the EEOC
Compliance Manual to help determine what action is required to remedy harassment by co-
workers); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1015-16 (8th Cir. 1988) (employer is liable if
management level employees knew or should have known of offensive conduct and failed to
take remedial steps to end that conduct).
184 See, e.g., Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445, 460 (N.J. 1993) (Under New
Jersey Law Against Discrimination, in a hostile work environment case an employer is strictly
liable for traditional employment damages such as back pay, reinstatement, front pay, and
equitable relief, for compensatory damages based on general agency principles, and for puni-
tive damages only if there is a showing of maliciousness or willfulness on the part of the
employer.).
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an agency capacity,'"5 or when the employer knew or should have
known of the conduct and failed to take immediate and appropriate
corrective action. 18 6 An employer would also be liable for the con-
duct of coworkers where the employer, its agents, or supervisory per-
sonnel knew or should have known of the conduct, and the employer
failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. 18 7 Under
the Proposed Guidelines, an employer can also be liable for the acts of
nonemployees in appropriate circumstances.' Additionally, em-
ployers'are advised to take all steps necessary to prevent harassment,
such as providing sensitivity training and implementing an effective
policy against harassment with an appropriate complaint procedure
and sanctions, both of which should be made available to all
employees. 189
The standards for employer liability under Title VII case law and
the EEOC Proposed Guidelines are essentially the same. For the
most part, they are appropriate in the ADA context, but only if modi-
fied to account for the specific language of the ADA. 190
B. Employer Liability and the ADA's Mandate Regarding Methods
of Administration
The language of the ADA provides a basis for employer liability
185 The EEOC Proposed Guidelines provide that an employer is liable for its conduct and
that of its agents and supervisory employees:
[r]egardless of whether the employer knew or should have known of the conduct,
where the harassing supervisory employee is acting in an "agency capacity." To
determine whether the harassing individual is acting in an "agency capacity," the
circumstances of the particular employment relationship and the job functions per-
formed by the harassing individual shall be examined. "Apparent authority" to
act on the employer's behalf shall be established where the employer fails to insti-
tute an explicit policy against harassment that is clearly and regularly communi-
cated to employees, or fails to establish a reasonably accessible procedure by which
victims of harassment can make their complaints known to appropriate officials
who are in a position to act on complaints.
EEOC Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at 51,269 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1609.2(a)(2)).
186 Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609.2(a)).
187 Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609.2(b)).
188 Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609.2(c)) (stating that an employer can be liable for
the harassing conduct of nonemployees when the employer, its agents, or supervisory person-
nel knew or should have known of the conduct, and failed to take immediate and appropriate
corrective action, as feasible. In making such an assessment, consideration should be given to
the extent of the employer's control over the nonemployees and any legal responsibility the
employer had regarding their conduct.).
189 Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609.2(d)).
190 Once again, the EEOC Proposed Guidelines set forth an excellent starting point, but fail
to consider the dichotomy between the ADA and the other statutes covered by the Guidelines.
Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609.2).
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in the hostile work environment context. The Act prohibits the use of
methods of administration that have a discriminatory effect or perpet-
uate the discrimination of others subject to the employer's common
control.1 91 All employees, supervisory or nonsupervisory, are subject
to the common control of the employer, 192 and methods of adminis-
tration can include both administrative action and inaction.
93
Viewing this in the context of an employer's duty to take action
to prevent harassment, 194 an employer cannot have policies that en-
able supervisors to create a hostile work environment or fail to have
adequate policies against harassment with appropriate reporting pro-
cedures. Additionally, employers must utilize methods of administra-
tion or discipline that are aimed at preventing coworkers 9 5 from
harassing employees. Employers cannot use any other method of ad-
ministration that has the effect of creating or perpetuating harass-
ment. If an employer does not utilize appropriate methods of
191 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3) (Supp. III 1991).
192 The fact that employers are able to take action to remedy harassment by coemployees,
see Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881-83 (9th Cir. 1991), and supervisors, see Andrews v.
City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1486 (3d Cir. 1990), demonstrates that while an employer can-
not control every action of an employee, all employees are subject to the common control of
the employer by virtue of the employment relationship. Otherwise, employers could not en-
force remedial measures necessary to vitiate a hostile work environment.
In Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., Engine Div., 797 F.2d 1417 (7th Cir. 1986), a racial
harassment case, the court held that, regarding employer liability for the intentional acts of
employees,
an employer is directly liable (that is, independently of respondeat superior) for
those torts committed against one employee by another, whether or not committed
in furtherance of the employer's business, that the employer could have prevented
by reasonable care in hiring, supervising, or if necessary firing the tortfeasor.
Id. at 1422 (citations omitted). This language, which was cited in Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842
F.2d 1010, 1016 (8th Cir. 1988), demonstrates that employees are under the common control
of the employer who controls their hiring, supervision, and termination.
193 An employer who fails to take adequate remedial action in response to a hostile work
environment can be liable under Title VII. See, e.g., Ellison, 924 F.2d at 881-83. Thus, liabil-
ity for methods of administration can be based on administrative inaction as well as action.
Similarly, in cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts have held municipalities liable for a
policy of inaction, see Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1992) (award against munici-
pality upheld in favor of arrestee when municipality's inaction regarding the incarceration of
detainees without prompt pretrial procedures amounted to deliberate indifference regarding
arrestee's constitutional rights), and have held that failure to act can constitute a policy which
subjects a municipality to liability, see Reynolds v. Borough of Avalon, 799 F. Supp. 442
(D.N.J. 1992) (failure of policymaking officials to take action regarding sexual harassment
could be actionable, but only if it rises to the level of deliberate indifference).
194 Ellison, 924 F.2d at 882; EEOC Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at 51,269 (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609.2(d)).
195 And in appropriate circumstances nonemployees. See EEOC Proposed Guidelines,
supra note 10, at 51,269 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609.2(c)) (providing that in appropriate
circumstances an employer can be liable for a hostile work environment created by non-
employees).
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administration, that employer should be strictly liable for conduct
which creates a hostile work environment.
The language of the ADA necessarily leads to this conclusion.
The ADA's mandate regarding methods of administration is clear,1 96
and violation of the mandate enables the creation or perpetuation of
the hostile work environment. If appropriate methods of administra-
tion are utilized, employer liability should be guided by the standards
set forth in Part III.D.197
C. Use of ADA Defenses to an Alleged Failure to Accommodate in
the Context of a Hostile Work Environment Claim
The ADA provides employers accused of failing to reasonably
accommodate with the defense that the requested or necessary accom-
modation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the
employer's business. 198 Additionally, the Civil Rights Act of 1991
provides a defense to damage awards upon a claim that the employer
failed to reasonably accommodate, if the employer demonstrates that
it made good faith efforts, in consultation with the employee, to iden-
tify and make a reasonable accommodation that would provide the
employee equal opportunity and would not impose undue hardship on
the employer.' 99 Likewise, if an employee is offered a reasonable ac-
commodation but refuses it, the employer will not be liable for failure
to accommodate under the ADA.2°
If these defenses, or any others, are available to an employer in
the context of an alleged failure to reasonably accommodate, such de-
fenses should also be available when failure to accommodate is alleged
in connection with a hostile work environment claim. However, those
defenses should only be available to the extent that they rebut the
alleged failure to reasonably accommodate.2"' Suppose an employer
successfully asserts a valid defense to the allegation that it failed to
196 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3) (Supp. III 1991).
197 In the context of liability for the conduct of supervisors, this standard is in agreement
with the EEOC Proposed Guidelines. The Proposed Guidelines would hold an employer who
does not have an effective complaint procedure liable for the acts of supervisors because such
supervisors are given apparent authority under those circumstances. See EEOC Proposed
Guidelines, supra note 10, at 51,269 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609.2(a)(2)). However, the
standard proposed herein would impose liability on an employer if any of its methods of ad-
ministration have the effect of creating or perpetuating a hostile work environment, regardless
of whether the harassing conduct alleged was perpetrated by a supervisory or nonsupervisory
employee.
198 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. III 1991); EEOC ADA Regulations, supra note 28,
§ 1630.15(d).
199 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(3) (Supp. III 1991).
200 EEOC ADA Regulations, supra note 28, § 1630.9(d).
201 See discussion supra part II.B.3.
1994] 1517
HeinOnline -- 15  Cardozo L. Rev.  1517 1993 - 1994
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
reasonably accommodate, and such failure is alleged to have contrib-
uted to a hostile work environment. If the remaining allegations are
sufficient to maintain the cause of action for hostile work environ-
ment, the complainant should be able to proceed, and the court
should determine the appropriate disposition of the evidence related
to the failure to accommodate claim.
The disposition of defenses to an alleged failure to reasonably
accommodate would depend on the facts of each case, because issues
such as "undue hardship" and "good faith" will be decided by the
trier of fact based on the available evidence.2 "2 Thus, even in those
rare cases where the failure to accommodate is alleged as the primary
cause of the hostile work environment,20 3 the applicability of defenses
will likely be determined fairly, in accordance with the requirements
of the ADA, the facts of the case, and the rules of the court involved.
D. The Appropriate Test to Determine Employer Liability for the
Conduct of Supervisory and Nonsupervisory Employees
Based on the foregoing interpretation of the law regarding em-
ployer liability for conduct creating a hostile work environment, in-
cluding the EEOC Proposed Guidelines, the following test for such
liability under the ADA is suggested: An employer is liable for its
conduct and that of its supervisory personnel when the supervisory
personnel, whose conduct created the hostile work environment, were
acting in an agency capacity or when the employer knew or should
have known of the conduct, and failed to take immediate and appro-
priate remedial action. An employer is liable for the conduct of non-
supervisory personnel when the employer, its agents, or supervisory
personnel knew or should have known of the conduct, and the em-
ployer failed to take immediate and appropriate remedial action.2 o4
The appropriateness of remedial action should be guided by existing
202 See, e.g., Gordon v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 791 F. Supp. 431 (S.D.N.Y.
1992), dismissed on other grounds, 810 F. Supp. 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (evidence was not specific
enough for the trier of fact to determine whether an accommodation would cause undue hard-
ship in a case based on failure to accommodate an employee's religious observances); Luke v.
American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 476 F.2d 1015, 1026-27 (8th Cir.) (Stephenson, J., dissenting)
(the trier of fact is entitled to consider the good faith of an insurer in refusing to defend, based
on circumstances indicating a lack of coverage in connection with an alleged refusal to settle
within policy limits), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973).
203 See discussion supra part II.B.3.
204 An employer may also be liable for the conduct of nonemployees when the employer, its
agents, or supervisory employees knew or should have known of the conduct and failed to take
immediate and appropriate corrective action, as feasible. In such cases, the extent of the em-
ployer's control over nonemployees and any other legal responsibility that the employer had
with respect to their conduct should be considered. EEOC Proposed Guidelines, supra note
10, at 51,269 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609.2(c)).
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Title VII law.2"5
However, if an employer's methods of administration have a dis-
criminatory effect or perpetuate the discrimination of others subject to
common administrative control, thus enabling the creation or perpet-
uation of harassment, the employer will be strictly liable for conduct
that creates a hostile work environment. In this regard, there should
be a rebuttable presumption 206 that such methods of administration
205 The language of the employer liability section of the EEOC Proposed Guidelines which
requires "immediate and appropriate corrective action," id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1609.2(a)(1)), is similar to the EEOC Guidelines on Sex Discrimination, supra note 25,
§ 1604.11 (d), which apply to Title VII, and also require "immediate and appropriate correc-
tive action" (in response to the harassing conduct of coemployees). Additionally, the concept
of hostile work environment which should be applied to harassment of disabled individuals
arose in Title VII law. See discussion supra part II.A. Thus, cases dealing with the appropri-
ateness of remedial action for hostile work environments under Title VII are instructive in the
context of disabled individuals.
There is an abundance of Title VII case law dealing with the appropriateness of remedial
action in relation to conduct creating a hostile work environment. For example, in Ellison v.
Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881-83 (9th Cir. 1991), the court held that the temporary transfer of an
employee whose conduct created a hostile work environment might be an insufficient remedy if
that employee returned to his former location, and remanded so that the district court could
determine the impact on the victim of the return of the harasser to the office where the victim
was located. Id. at 882-83. Cases from other circuits, some of which are cited in Ellison, have
also considered the sufficiency of remedies aimed at alleviating a hostile work environment,
and have created general tests or found specific remedies to be necessary or sufficient. See
Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1486 (3d Cir. 1990) (employer must investigate
complaints and take appropriate action to curb sexism); Dornhecker v. Malibu Grand Prix
Corp., 828 F.2d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 1987) (remedies must be "assessed proportionately to the
seriousness of the offense," and assurance that victim would not have to work with harasser
after return from the business trip which victim was. on, which assurance came within twelve
hours of complaint, was sufficient); Barrett v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 726 F.2d 424, 426-27 (8th
Cir. 1984) (full investigation, reprimand of harasser, and placement of harasser on ninety-day
probation with a warning that further misconduct would result in discharge, was sufficient to
remedy a hostile work environment); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983) (em-
ployer must take measures reasonably calculated to end harassment, and an ineffective sexual
harassment policy is insufficient).
206 The utilization of rebuttable presumptions in the context of employment discrimination
cases is not uncommon. Recently, in St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993),
the Supreme Court utilized a rebuttable presumption in a disparate treatment case. In so
doing, the Court defined the concept of a presumption and explained how, in the disparate
treatment context, a presumption could be rebutted, referring to Federal Rule of Evidence 301:
To establish a "presumption" is to say that a finding of the predicate fact (here, the
prima facie case) produces "a required conclusion in the absence of explanation"
(here, the finding of unlawful discrimination). Thus, the McDonnell Douglas pre-
sumption places upon the defendant... the burden of "producing evidence" that
the adverse employment actions were taken "for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason." "[T]he defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of ad-
missible evidence," reasons for its actions which, if believed by the trier of fact,
would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the
employment action. It is important to note, however, that although the McDon-
nell Douglas presumption shifts the burden of production to the defendant, "It]he
ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally
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have a discriminatory effect or perpetuate the discriminatory conduct
of others, when the employer does not have in place an effective policy
against harassment, an appropriate complaint procedure for the
victims of harassment, appropriate sanctions against employees per-
petuating harassment, including supervisory employees, or training
regarding harassment when economically feasible for the employer.20 7
No policy or procedure is appropriate if it is not clearly communi-
cated to all of the employer's agents and employees, both supervisory
and nonsupervisory. °8
When failure to reasonably accommodate is alleged in connec-
tion with a hostile work environment claim, all defenses applicable
to that allegation should remain available. However, such defenses
are only applicable to rebut the claim that the employer failed to rea-
sonably accommodate. If such defenses are successfully asserted re-
garding the allegation that the employer failed to reasonably
accommodate, the claim of hostile work environment will remain via-
ble so long as the remaining evidence, taken as a whole, is sufficient to
maintain such a claim. 2°
CONCLUSION
Employment discrimination law is undergoing a major transfor-
mation. Among the most significant changes is the effectuation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act which prohibits, inter alia, discrimi-
nation against disabled individuals in regard to employment, public
services, public accommodations, and services operated by private en-
tities. The ADA is the first federal legislation to provide protection
for disabled individuals, regardless of whether the employer is public,
private, or receives federal funding. The Act's proscription on em-
discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." In this
regard it operates like all presumptions, as described in Rule 301 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of
Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom
it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the
presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense
of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the
party on whom it was originally cast.
Id. at 2747 (citations omitted).
207 EEOC Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at 51,269 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1609.2(d)) (employers should effectuate appropriate policies and procedures to prevent har-
assment). Regarding the necessity that such policies be effective, see Katz, 709 F.2d. at 256
(harassment policy which is ineffective will not preclude employer liability).
208 EEOC Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10.
209 Id. at 51,269 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609.1(e)) (in determining whether conduct
constitutes harassment the record as a whole should be considered).
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ployment discrimination is broad, and the remedies available for
ADA claims pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1991 include com-
pensatory and punitive damages. It is therefore imperative that the
bases for the causes of action available under the ADA, and their
structures, be set forth early. This will provide employers with the
opportunity to take preventive action, and disabled individuals, many
of whom have never been protected against such a broad array of
discriminatory employment practices, with a consistent remedy when
they are the victims of employment discrimination.
Among the discriminatory employment practices prohibited by
the ADA is workplace harassment. The language of the Act, which
clearly forbids discrimination in relation to any term, condition, or
privilege of employment, and prohibits methods of administration
that have a discriminatory effect or perpetuate the discrimination of
others under an employer's common control, acknowledges such a
cause of action. The basis for an actionable claim of workplace har-
assment is that harassing conduct interferes with the terms and condi-
tions of employment. Also, an employer's methods of administration
are important in establishing employer liability for the conduct of
employees.
Additionally, the EEOC has proposed guidelines on harassment,
which protect disabled employees, as well as several other classes,
from workplace harassment. These guidelines demonstrate the avail-
ability of such a cause of action, although they do not discuss the
statutory basis for it under the ADA. Because the EEOC Proposed
Guidelines are not binding, and do not specifically account for some
of the unique provisions of the ADA or needs of disabled individuals,
it is important to analyze the cause of action in light of its statutory
basis, and to develop a workable structure accordingly.
Based on the case law applicable to workplace harassment under
Title VII, state discrimination statutes, the EEOC Proposed Guide-
lines, and common law theories used under the Rehabilitation Act,
the best theory of liability to be utilized in connection with claims for
workplace harassment under the ADA is "hostile work environ-
ment." However, in order to provide a workable structure for hostile
work environment claims under the ADA, the test for hostile work
environment developed under Title VII must be modified to account
for the unique provisions of the ADA and concerns relating to disabil-
ity-based discrimination. Unfortunately, the EEOC Proposed Guide-
lines, while an excellent starting point, apply to too many classes to
account for the specific concerns applicable to workplace harassment
of disabled employees.
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Likewise, the traditional standards for employer liability in con-
nection with workplace harassment must be modified to account for
the dichotomy between hostile work environment claims brought
under the ADA, and those brought under other discrimination stat-
utes. Additionally, whether dealing with the structure of the hostile
work environment cause of action under the ADA, or employer liabil-
ity for such a claim, the applicability of the concept of reasonable
accommodation, and the defenses to claims that an employer failed to
reasonably accommodate, must be integrated into the hostile work
environment theory. However, this must be done in such a manner
that failure to reasonably accommodate need not be alleged to suc-
cessfully state a claim for hostile work environment, but can be as-
serted in connection therewith when appropriate.
The structure for the hostile work environment cause of action
under the ADA set forth in this Article provides a workable frame-
work for such claims. It can augment the EEOC Proposed Guide-
lines if they are codified as presently expressed, or influence their
revision in relation to the ADA. Regardless of the structure applied,
there is a significant statutory basis for such a cause of action. Thus,
attacks on the availability of a hostile work environment cause of ac-
tion under the ADA should not prevail.
The ADA provides disabled individuals with protection in all the
terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether their em-
ployers receive government funding. This development is long over-
due. Now that such rights do exist, delineating their statutory basis
and setting forth workable standards for their application is necessary
to insure compliance with the Act, and to provide a framework within
which those rights can be protected.
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